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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Lon Fuller, writing in 1964, noted that any attempt to create and maintain a system of 
legal rules might “miscarry” in at least eight ways, which are, “if you will, eight distinct 
routes to disaster.”1  Among these eight ways of legislating for disaster, five are 
important for this dissertation.  These are: (1) a failure to achieve rules at all, so that 
every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis; (2) a failure to publicise or to make 
available to the affected party, the rules that the affected party is expected to observe; (3) 
an abuse of retroactive legislation, as it not only cannot itself guide action, but it 
undercuts the integrity of rules with a prospective effect by putting them under the threat 
of restrospective change; (4) enactment of contradictory rules; and (5) a failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.2
 
Fuller’s views were based on his allegory of the monarchical rule of Rex.3  His views 
were based on sound logic and, it is submitted that, they transcend time and, as such, are 
applicable to modern legal systems, including the South African legal system.  Crucially, 
Fuller is of the view that any one of the ways of legislating for disaster, if pursued to 
finality, does not simply result in a bad system of law but, “it results in something that is 
not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which 
a void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.”4   
 
It is argued in this dissertation that Fuller’s views are relevant in so far as they apply to 
the issue of ex post facto environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) authorisations in 
South African law.  In this dissertation I consider the issue of ex post facto EIA 
authorisations from the inception of the EIA regime in South African law to present.  At 
the heart of the analysis is the question of whether, at different stages of the evolvement 
of the EIA regime, such authorisations are provided for in South African law, adequately 
or at all.  If such authorisations are provided for, a related question which is also 
                                                 
1 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law. Copyright 1964 by Yale University. Reprinted, by permission of the 
Yale University Press, In Joel Feinberg and Jules Coleman, Philosophy of Law, Sixth Edition, (2000), 
Wadsmith, page 93. 
2 Ibid, page 93. 
3 Ibid, page 93. 
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considered is whether such provision does not amount to legislating for disaster (in 
Fuller’s words) in any of the five ways that are mentioned above.  Conversely, if such 
authorizations are not provided for, a related question is whether that, on its own, 
amounts to legislating for disaster. 
 
Crucially, the nature of the EIA is such that an ex post facto EIA and a subsequent 
authorization are an anomaly.  An EIA is a proactive, prospective and planning tool that 
is applicable to activities before they commence.  The literature on EIAs supports this 
argument.  The current South African EIA regime, like other regimes of many foreign 
jurisdictions some of which are considered in this dissertation, seems to be based on this 
assertion.  The attitude of the relevant (South African) national environmental authority 
seems to support this view.  In this regard, the ten-year review of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (“DEAT”) dated 2004 states that: 
 
“Over the past decade the department, together with the provincial authorities, have (sic.) 
been implementing a cutting-edge environmental impact management tool – the EIA.  
Since 1997 all new developments that could result in significant environmental pollution 
or degradation have been subjected to a rigorous assessment of their possible impacts.”5  
(Emphasis supplied.) 
 
This quote clearly indicates how critical EIA has been, as a tool, at the disposal of DEAT 
and provincial authorities.  Important to note in this quote is that, by its own admission, 
DEAT, which is the national department principally responsible for environmental affairs 
seems to have regarded an EIA (since 1997) as applicable to “new developments that 
could result in significant environmental pollution or degradation.”  This is an important 
consideration although it is not decisive.  It is important because the quote is by the 
department that was responsible for developing policy which was eventually 
implemented by promulgating the relevant regulations that perfected the EIA regime in 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Ibid, page 93. 
5 Page 62. 
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South African law.6   Hence what this department regards as the ambit of the EIA regime 
is important as it determines the manner in which it implements the relevant 
requirements.  The consideration is, by no means, a decisive factor because the courts 
ultimately interpret statutory provisions to determine their meaning.  Courts make such 
determinations, mainly, in the context of performing their judicial review function in 
respect of administrative decisions.      
 
While, at first glance, the concept of “new developments” as used in the above quote 
gives a particular meaning the same cannot be said if it is applied to specific 
circumstances.  For instance, where 10 per cent of construction of a dam has been 
undertaken a question arises whether can it still be regarded as a “new development” that 
may require an EIA before completion?  Related to this question is the question of 
whether the matter is dealt with by the de minimus principle in terms of which the law 
does not attach any consequences on conduct with trivial consequences.  In other words, 
it may be argued that, there may be circumstances where the consequences of the 
development undertaken before the lodging of an application for authorisation are so 
trivial that the law would regard the development as a “new development”.  If that were 
to be the position of the law the question that would arise is what constitutes “trivial 
consequences”? This question poses a difficulty if one has regard to the fact that what 
constitutes trivial consequences to the environment is not free from doubt.  This is 
because the opposite of trivial consequences is significant impact to the environment, an 
issue which is equally not free from doubt. 
 
Another question that arises is whether completed activities can be regarded as new 
developments.  While this question may prompt a quick answer in the negative it is 
argued that the matter is not that simple.  There may be a situation where a person 
undertakes and completes a development without undertaking an EIA as required by the 
law in a case where a person would have been granted an authorization had it been 
applied for.  In such a case, should the person be obliged to demolish the development 
                                                 
6 This is the case, it is argued, even though the relevant regulations were promulgated under an old statute, 
namely the Environment Conservation Act, 73 of 1989, which statute was passed by the old National Party 
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and then undertake an EIA and, once he or she has obtained authorization, reconstruct the 
development?  That seems absurd and the law must be interpreted in a way that avoids 
such absurdity.  If one follows this reasoning to its logical conclusion then, in such a 
situation, the development should be treated as a new development for the purposes of 
undertaking an EIA.  The difficulty with this reasoning, however, is that it is difficult to 
determine whether the development would have been authorized, or not, after it has been 
completed.  Expediency may prevail and may result in most developments which are 
already completed being regarded as new developments and being authorized even 
though they may not have been authorized had an EIA preceded the development. 
 
In the next Chapter I consider literature which deals with the nature of an EIA.  Chapter 3 
deals with the current EIA regime and, specifically, considers whether it provides for ex 
post facto EIA authorisations.  In Chapter 4 I briefly consider whether international law 
provides any guidance on ex post facto EIA authorizations.  This is followed by Chapter 
5 that considers the EIA regimes of ten foreign jurisdictions with a view to ascertain 
whether they provide for EIA authorizations.  Chapter 6 critically analyses the provisions 
of National Environmental Management: Second Amendment Act7 which provide for ex 
post facto EIA authorizations.  In conclusion, in Chapter 7, I summarise the findings of 
this dissertation. 
   
CHAPTER 2: NATURE OF AN EIA 
In order to appreciate the nature of an ex post facto EIA, it is important to appreciate the 
nature of an EIA.  Wood, correctly asserts that, an EIA is the evaluation of the effects 
likely to arise from a major project (or other action) significantly affecting the natural and 
man-made environment and must lead to abandonment of environmentally unacceptable 
actions and to the mitigation to the point of acceptability of environmental effects of 
proposals which are approved.8  Wood adds that an “EIA is thus an anticipatory, 
                                                                                                                                                 
government in its last decade of apartheid rule.  
7 8 of 2004. 
8 Cristopher Wood, Environmental Impact Assessment – A comparative review, (1995), Longman Group 
Limited, page 1.  
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participatory environmental management tool, of which the EIA report is only one part.”9  
This, Wood continues, is made clear by the objectives of the Californian EIA system 
which are: to disclose to decision-makers and the public the significant environmental 
effects of proposed activities; to identify ways to avoid or reduce environmental damage; 
to prevent environmental damage by requiring implementation of feasible alternatives or 
mitigation measures; to disclose to the public reasons for approvals of projects with 
significant environmental effects; to foster coordination; and to enhance public 
participation.10   It is submitted that these objectives clearly capture the essence of an 
EIA as a proactive planning tool. 
 
Armour expresses a similar view when stating that it is a principle that “for the EIA to be 
meaningful and useful, impact analysis must occur early in the planning process and prior 
to any decision to proceed with a project or action.”11  The use of the phrase “meaningful 
and useful” by Armour is worth noting.  Implicit in this phrase is that an EIA which is 
done later, after a decision to proceed with a project or action is made, is meaningless and 
useless.  It is submitted that therein stems the problem of ex post facto EIAs and 
subsequent authorisations.  The term “ex post facto” is a Latin term which means “from a 
thing done afterwards” or “after the deed”.12  When this term is used in relation to an EIA 
or an EIA authorisation it refers, respectively, to an EIA undertaken after the activity or 
project has been commenced with or to an EIA authorisation granted for an activity or 
project that has been commenced with.   Notably, in some jurisdictions ex post facto 
EIAs are referred to as “retrospective EIAs”.13  For instance, in the Chinese EIA regime 
it has been stated that EIAs can be classified into three categories as “retrospective 
environmental impact assessment for existing projects, the present environmental impact 
assessment for project under construction and the prospective environmental impact 
                                                 
9 Wood, (1995), page 1. 
10 Wood, (1995), page 2. 
11 Armour, A. (1991), Impact Assessment and the Planning Process: A Status Report. Impact Assessment 
Buletin 9(4): 27 – 33, page 29, quoted from Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation and Impact 




assessment for project under planning.  Generally speaking, the environmental impact 
assessment refers almost all (sic.) to the prospective EIA.”14    
 
Furthermore, there is a view that an EIA is not only ex post facto in the circumstances 
referred to above.  It is also ex post facto where it is undertaken when it is preceded by a 
decision to proceed with an activity.  This point is made in the following statement which 
relates to EIAs in the United Kingdom: “In the worst cases EIA is undertaken as a 
retrospective process when the nature of the development has already been determined 
and is in effect fixed.”15  This is an interesting dimension as it places within the ambit of 
an ex post facto EIA an EIA which is undertaken in respect of an activity to which, even 
though it has not been commenced with, a decision has been taken to the effect that it will 
proceed and the manner in which it will proceed has been determined.  Such an EIA falls 
squarely within the category of EIAs that, in Armour’s views, are meaningless and 
useless.   
 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Armour’s statement to the effect that an EIA is 
meaningless and useless where a decision to commence with an activity or project has 
been made means that, where an activity or project has been commenced with or 
completed an EIA is even more meaningless and useless.  In this regard, it is submitted 
that, while Armour’s statement is accurate there may be limited circumstances where 
such an EIA is of significance in so far as it enables the taking of mitigation and remedial 
measures is concerned.  In fact, herein is a crucial distinction that must be drawn.  The 
critical analysis in this dissertation is on ex post facto EIAs that are undertaken with a 
view to obtain an authorization and not on EIAs that are undertaken with a view to 
monitor and deal with environmental effects of on going activities.  It is submitted that 
the scholars’ views discussed here also relate to the former.        
  
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council made a point similar to that 
made by Armour when it advanced a criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of an EIA.  




It stated that an EIA is considered effective if: information generated in the EIA 
contributed to decision-making; predictions of the effectiveness of impact management 
measures were accurate; and proposed mitigatory and compensatory measures achieved 
approved management objectives.16  Simple put, the argument in this regard is that there 
can be no effective EIA where an activity was undertaken without one in the first place.  
In addition, the effectiveness of such an EIA is seriously undermined from the outset.  
This is because, when the EIA is undertaken, there are already parts of the activity whose 
undertaking was not informed by an EIA. 
 
The view of McCutcheon makes a point which is similar to the ones made above.  
McCutcheon states that an EIA is “a way to tackle pollution problems proactively – 
evaluating a project prior to building it and determining whether it should be built in the 
first instance – as distinguished from the regulatory model which merely ensures that 
whatever is [already] built complies with a standard.”17  In this statement an ex post facto 
EIA would qualify as a reactive regulatory model which merely ensures that whatever 
has been built would qualify and cannot be referred to as an EIA.   
 
Taken together, the views of Wood, Armour, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Research Council and McCutcheon support the principle that an effective EIA which 
complies with the objectives of undertaking an EIA is one that is proactive, undertaken 
early in the planning process and, in any event, before an activity or project is 
commenced with.  In this context, an ex post facto EIA is an anomaly.  Logically, so is 
the ex post facto EIA authorisation.   
 
Clearly, Fuller’s views on legislating for disaster are relevant to the issue of ex post facto 
EIAs.  To provide for an ex post facto EIA amounts to a contradiction in terms: the law 
states that an EIA must undertaken prior to the undertaking of particular activities or 
projects; it also states, on the other hand, that an EIA may be undertaken after the 
                                                 
16 Wood, (1995), page 9. 
17 McCutcheon, Edward D., Think Globally, (En)Act Locally: Promoting Effective National Environmental 
Regulatory Infrastructures in Developing Nations, Cornell International Law Journal (Volume 31) 1998, 
page 450. 
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undertaking of activities which required an EIA in the first place.  It also creates two EIA 
regimes: one which is effective in line with the authors’ views (and based on sound 
theoretical basis) and; the other which is potentially meaningless, useless and ineffective.       
 
There is also another side of the coin in this debate.  There is an unstated value in 
providing for or undertaking ex post facto EIAs and authorizations.  The value is that it 
brings activities undertaken without an EIA authorization within the control of the 
responsible authorities.  While the provision for ex post facto EIA is at odds with the 
meaningfulness, usefulness and effectiveness of the EIA regime, as discussed above, it 
seems to be a necessary evil in some countries given their particular circumstances.   
Hence, in some countries, it would seem that the question is not whether or not to provide 
for ex post facto EIAs but (it is) how to provide for ex post facto EIAs that are effective 
and which address the circumstances of the country concerned and do not undermine the 
ordinary EIA regime.  In such countries, there is a real possibility for the EIA regime to 
disintegrate and become a Pickwickian legal system as visualized by Fuller.         
 
It is submitted that, practically, there are five possible ways of dealing with the issue of 
ex post facto EIAs.  The first is for the EIA legislation to expressly prohibit it.  In this 
case the legislation is clear in that an ex post facto EIA authorisation may not be granted.  
The second is for the EIA legislation to be silent on the issue.  As it is shown below, this 
is the most common way of dealing with the issue.  In this case there is confusion on 
whether an ex post facto EIA authorisation may be granted or not.  Reliance is placed on 
the courts to interpret the provisions of the applicable legislation.  In common law 
jurisdictions, the principles and rules of common law play a major role in this regard.  
The third is for the EIA regime to expressly provide for a narrow scope of undertaking ex 
post facto EIAs and the granting of ex post facto EIA authorisations.  This way has its 
own problems in that the extent of the scope provided is often arbitrary and may lead to 
absurdity.  This is the manner in which the issue is provided for in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho.  The fourth way is to provide for an unlimited scope of the undertaking of ex 
post facto EIAs and the granting of ex post facto EIA authorisations.  This leads to a 
situation of two EIA regimes operating side-by-side as discussed above.  The fifth way is 
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to provide for an ex post facto EIA and authorisations on an ad hoc basis.  In this regard, 
the relevant authority issues notices granting an opportunity for defaulters to lodge 
applications for or to undertake ex post facto EIAs within a period of time.  This has its 
own potential problems as it must be accompanied by actual threat of prosecution of 
those who do not take advantage of the given window period.  Otherwise there would be 
a need to keep on extending the window period.  This may seriously undermine the EIA 
regime as it seems to be the case in India, as is discussed below.  
 
Each of the five ways of dealing with the issue, it is submitted, if pursued to finality, fits 
perfectly on one or more of Fuller’s ways of legislating for disaster discussed above.  The 
discussion in the next chapters illustrates this point.        
 
CHAPTER 3: CURRENT EIA REGIME 
Introduction 
The point of departure is to consider the relevant provisions of the Constitution.  The 
1996 Constitution gives everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being, and “to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, though reasonable legislative and other measures that- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and  
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.”18  
 
The above constitutional provision places an obligation, among others, on the 
government to take reasonable measures that give effect to the environmental right.  Such 
measures include the passing of appropriate laws and adoption of appropriate policies.  In 
the context of EIAs, it is argued that, the government had an obligation introduce, 
maintain and enforce EIA laws.   
 
 11
Once such laws are passed a person that infringes them, automatically, infringes the 
constitutional right.  In the case of The Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) 
Ltd and Another,19 the court captured this when it said that “the applicant has established 
that the operation of the Rheese burner by the respondent without a certificate of 
registration under s 9 of the Act [Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965] is 
unlawful conduct.  It is not only unlawful in the light of s 9, but in my view, the 
generation of smoke in these circumstances, in the teeth of the law, as it were, is an 
infringement of the respondent’s neighbours to ‘an environment which is not detrimental 
to their health or well-being’ – enshrined for them in section 29 of the Constitution of 
South Africa Act 200 of 1993.”20  By analogy, this applies to a situation where a person 
has undertaken an activity in contravention of EIA laws.        
 
The Constitution also clearly requires government to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.”21  It also further provides that “all constitutional 
obligations must be performed diligently and without delay.”22 In the context of EIA 
laws, the Constitution places an obligation on the relevant organs of state to ensure that, 
among others, those who disregard the requirement to undertake an EIA are brought to 
book.  An ex post facto EIA in South African situation must be understood in this 
context.  Essentially, it is an EIA undertaken in respect of an activity which was 
undertaken in contravention of a constitutional right.  To eventually authorize that 
activity may in certain circumstances allow a person to benefit from the contravention of 
a constitutional right.  
 
Principle of preventive action 
Before dealing with statutory provisions on the issue of ex post facto EIA authorisation, it 
is important to take into account the principle of preventative action and to discuss its 
impact on the issue.  This principle emanates international law but is now part of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Section 24. 
19 1996(6) SA 155 (N). 
20 Page 164. 
21 Section 7(2). 
22 Section 237. 
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South African law.  The 1996 Constitution states that customary international law is law 
in South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or a statute.23  I agree with 
Sands that this principle has become part of body of customary international law because 
of its wide international support.24
 
The essence of this principle is the obligation on states to prevent damage to the 
environment and to reduce, limit or control activities which might cause or risk such 
damage.25  The principle is clearly consistent with the Constitution and other relevant 
statutes.  It is argued that directly, or indirectly, national EIA legislation, including South 
African, is designed to comply with this principle.  This argument is in line with Sands’ 
view as he states that “under the preventative principle, a state may be under an 
obligation to prevent damage to the environment within its own jurisdiction, including by 
means of appropriate regulatory, administrative and other measures.”26  
   
There is flexibility involved in the principle as Sands points out that it requires action to 
be taken at an early stage and “if possible” prior to the damage has occurred.27   
Arguably, the undertaking of an ex post facto EIA is contrary to the principle of 
preventive action.  This is the case, especially, where it is possible to take action by 
undertaking an EIA in order to apply for authorisation.  Sands also points out that the 
principle may take several forms, including the use of penalties and the application of 
liability rules.28  
  
Statutory provisions  
The current EIA regime is governed by the provisions of the Environment Conservation 
Act29 (the “ECA”) and took effect with the promulgation of its regulations,30 namely the 
                                                 
23 Section 232. 
24 Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 
(2003), page 249. 
25 Sands, (2003), page 246. 
26 Sands, (2003), page 246. 
27 Sands, (2003), page 247. 
28 Sands, (2003), page 247. 
29 73 of 1989. 
30 Under section 21. 
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“Identification of activities which may have a substantial detrimental effect on the 
environmental effect” regulations31 and the “General EIA Regulations”32. 
 
Glazewski notes that EIAs have been undertaken extensively in South Africa, since the 
1970s, not because the law required it but because of the development of the Integrated 
Environmental Management (IEM) procedure from the Council for the Environment and 
the DEAT.33   Glazewski notes further that the relevant provisions of the ECA were 
developed roughly at the same time as the IEM procedure but the two processes were not 
aligned.34     
 
On 9 June 1989, the ECA came into effect and, among others, provided a framework for 
the current EIA regime.  The first component of this EIA framework is the power of the 
Minister of DEAT to identify activities “which in his opinion may have a substantial 
detrimental effect on the environment, whether in general or in respect of certain 
areas.”35  
 
The second component is the prohibition imposed on the undertaking of identified 
activities except upon a written authorization.36  The third component is that the 
authorization may only be issued after the consideration of reports regarding “the impact 
of the proposed activity and of alternative proposed activities on the environment.”37  
The fourth component is the discretionary power to grant or refuse authorization for the 
proposed activity or an alternative proposed activity.38  The fifth component is the 
discretionary power to withdraw an authorization upon breach of a condition in the 
authorization and the exercise of this power is subject to the giving of a 30 days’ notice to 
the affected person.39  The sixth component is that undertaking an identified activity 
                                                 
31 Government Notice R1182, Government Gazette 18261 of 5 September 1997, as amended. 
32 Government Notice R1183, Government Gazette 18261 of 5 September 1997, as amended. 
33 Glazewski, Environmental Law in South Africa, First Editions, (2000), Butterworth Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 
page 279. 
34 Glazewski, page 280.  
35 Secton 21(1). 
36 Section 22(1). 
37 Section 22(2). 
38 Section 22(3). 
39 Section 22(4). 
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without the requisite authorization, or breaching a condition in an authorization, is an 
offence.40  The commission of this offence attracts a fine which does not exceed 
R100,000.00 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or to both such a 
fine and such imprisonment, and to fine not exceeding three times the commercial value 
of any thing in respect of which the offence was committed.41
 
A crucial point worth noting in respect of the commission of the above-mentioned 
offence is that on or after 29 January 1999 it triggers the application of the provisions of 
section 34 of the National Environmental Management Act42 (the “NEMA”).  The above-
mentioned offence is listed in Schedule 3 of the NEMA.  The provisions of section 34 
provide, among others, that a person convicted of the above-mentioned offence (or any 
offence listed in Schedule) may be ordered by a court: 
• to pay for the loss suffered by any organ of state or other person, “including the 
cost incurred or likely to be incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating the 
environment or preventing damage to the environment”; 
• in addition to any other punishment imposed, to pay damages or compensation or 
a fine equal to the amount the court assessed as any advantage gained or likely to 
be gained by the offender as a consequence of the offence; and 
• to pay reasonable costs incurred by the public prosecutor and the organ of state 
concerned in the investigation and the prosecution of the offence.   
 
The Minister, by promulgating the regulations under the provisions of the ECA, in 
1997, brought into effect the current EIA regime.  An important point to emphasise is 
that the Minister may only act within the framework of the ECA in promulgating the 
regulations and it is clear that it applies to “proposed activities” because it provides 
that an authorization may be issued only “after consideration of reports concerning 
the impact of the proposed activity and of alternative proposed activities.”43  From 
                                                 
40 Section 29(4). 
41 Section 29(4). 
42 107 of 1998. 
43 Section 22(2). 
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this perspective it seems that the current EIA regime does not provide for the 
undertaking of an ex post facto EIA.   
 
There are two related points that need further elucidation in respect of the above 
paragraph.  The first is that an activity that is commenced with may not be logically 
termed “a proposed activity”.  This is obviously subject to the de minimus principle.  
The second is that an activity that is completed is definitely not “a proposed activity” 
since one cannot propose to do what is already done.  This must, however, be 
understood in the context of the EIA regulations as are discussed below. 
 
The first set of identified activities start with an introductory phrase which is “the 
construction, erection or upgrading of”44 and then a list fifteen categories of facilities 
and infrastructure is set out.  Among the listed infrastructure are: roads, railways, 
airfields and associated structures.45  The second set of identified activities begins 
with an introductory phrase “the change of land use from”46 and then list “agricultural 
or zoned undetermined use or any equivalent zoning, to any other land use”47, “use 
for grazing to any other form of agricultural use”48 and “use for nature conservation 
or zoned open space to any other land use”49.  The regulations list nine other sets of 
identified activities which sets include scheduled processes listed in the Second 
Schedule to the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act.50  Scheduled processes as a 
trigger for a requirement to undertake an EIA provide an interesting scenario since 
these processes are ongoing activities while most other activities are once off.  Hence 
to undertake a scheduled process without an EIA authorization amounts to an ongoing 
commission of an offence.    
 
Related to the issue of scheduled processes being ongoing activities, as discussed 
above, is the question of whether in respect of other activities which trigger the 
                                                 
44 Regulation 1 of the Identification of activities regulations. 
45 Regulation 1(d). 
46 Regulation 2. 
47 Regulation 2(c). 
48 Regulation 2(d). 
49 Regulation 2(e). 
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requirement to undertake an EIA does the unlawfulness of the activity stop when, for 
instance, the construction of a facility is completed.  An example that may be used 
here is the construction of a road for which a fee is charged for its use without 
authorization as required by the current EIA framework.51  The construction of that 
road is an offence in terms of the current EIA frame but a question arises whether the 
subsequent operation thereof is an offence.  The EIA framework does not explicitly 
prohibit the operation from or on infrastructure or facilities which were constructed 
without the required EIA authorization.  It is, however, argued that such an operation 
amounts to benefiting from a crime and, as such, the proceeds of the operation are 
proceeds of crime.  As such, the law, logically, cannot allow the generation of 
proceeds of crime.  Besides the fact that to allow the generation of proceeds of crime 
would be contra bonos mores another point to note, as discussed above, is that the 
current EIA framework gives a court discretion to enquire into and assess the 
monetary value of any advantage gained or likely to be gained as consequence of 
committing an offence by undertaking an identified activity without the required 
authorization.52  As stated above, in addition to any punishment of the offender, a 
court may order the award of damages or compensation or a fine equal to the amount 
so assessed.  Although a court has discretion to undertake the enquiry and assessment 
in this regard it is argued that it is clear that the intention of the Legislature as 
expressed in the EIA framework is to provide for the forfeiture of proceeds of 
criminal conduct.  This is a clear indication that the Legislature intended to prohibit 
the use of infrastructure which infrastructure was constructed by committing an 
offence in terms of the EIA framework.  To issue an ex post facto EIA would seem 
not to be in line with this intention.   
 
The General EIA regulations set out the EIA process that is followed if one wants to 
obtain an authorization to undertake an identified activity and other related matters.  
Key features of the EIA process include public participation, information gathering 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 45 of 1965. 
51 Regulation 1(d) read with Regulation 11(b). 
52 Section 34 of the NEMA read with Schedule 3. 
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and reporting to the decision-maker, while the process itself is undertaken by an 
independent consultant who is appointed by an applicant. 
 
The first step in the EIA process is the lodging of an application with the relevant 
authority who may be the Minister or a provincial department of environmental 
affairs depending on the nature of the application concerned.53  The second step is the 
consideration of the application by the relevant authority.54  As a result of this 
consideration, the relevant authority either request the applicant to submit a plan of 
study for scooping and for the purposes of eventually producing a scoping report or to 
submit a scoping report without a prior plan of study.55  At this stage it is important to 
note that the consideration of alternatives is already part of the picture since a plan of 
study for scoping must include “a description of proposed method of identifying the 
environmental issues and alternatives.”56  The General EIA regulations define the 
term “alternative” as “in relation to an activity … any other possible course of action, 
including an option not to act.”57  Also important to note is that plan must include a 
brief description of the activity “to be undertaken.”58   Considered together, these 
requirements make it clear that the EIA process is designed to apply to activities yet 
to be undertaken.  An option not to undertake an activity is rendered a nullity where 
the activity has been undertaken and completed.  It may be exercised where an 
activity has been partially undertaken, depending on the circumstances of each case, 
although it would be severely compromised.   
 
As part of the second step, the relevant authority considers the plan of study for 
scoping and may accept it or may request additional information from the application 
before accepting the plan of study.59  The third step is the undertaking of the scoping 
process, submission and consideration of a scoping report.  A component of the 
public participation process takes place at this stage since a scoping report must 
                                                 
53 Regulation 4. 
54 Regulation 5.  
55 Regulation 5(1). 
56 Regulation 5(2)(e). 
57 Regulation 1. 
58 Regulation 5(2)(a). 
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include an appendix containing a description of the public participation process and a 
list of interested parties and their comments.60   
 
At this stage the relevant authority may decide that the information contained in the 
scoping report is sufficient for the consideration of the application without further 
investigation or that the information is insufficient and that a full EIA must be 
undertaken before the application is considered or that the scoping report must be 
amended before it is considered.61
 
The fourth step is the submission of a plan of study for EIA.  This stage builds upon 
the scoping process since the plan of study for EIA must include a description of the 
feasible alternatives identified during scoping that may be further investigated and an 
indication of additional information required to determine the potential impacts of the 
proposed activity on the environment.62  The use of the term “proposed activities” in 
these requirements is important to note.  It makes it clear that the EIA framework is 
designed to apply to activities not yet undertaken.  
 
The above step is followed by the undertaking of an EIA and the submission of an 
EIA report (“the EIR”).  The key features of this step include public participation, an 
assessment of each alternatives and a comparative assessment of all alternatives.63                               
An EIA process culminates into an EIR which is submitted to the relevant authority 
for its consideration. 
 
The fifth step is the consideration of the application as underpinned by all the 
information and reports submitted by the applicant.  This step may follow the 
submission of the scoping report where the relevant authority deems the information 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Regulation 5(3). 
60 Regulation 6(1)(e). 
61 Regulation 6(3). 
62 Regulation 7(1). 
63 Regulation 8. 
 19
contained in that report sufficient that the application may be considered.64  In other 
circumstances it may also follow the submission of an EIR.65   
 
The relevant authority considers the application and may issue an authorization (with 
or without conditions) or refuse the application and, where an authorization is issued, 
(it) must determine the period of validity of such authorization.66  Conditions that are 
imposed on authorization may be reviewed and amended or deleted “in a manner that 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”67
 
When the relevant takes a decision to grant or refuse an EIA application it must issue 
a record of that decision to the applicant and, where requested, to any other interested 
party.68   Importantly, the record of decision must include: a brief description of the 
proposed activity and the implementation programme for which the authorization is 
issued; and the specific place where the activity is to be undertaken.69  This puts it 
beyond doubt that the current EIA regime designed to apply to activities that have not 
yet been undertaken.  Otherwise, the requirements referred to here would be 
irrelevant to activities already undertaken. 
 
Finally, the General Regulations provide for the process to be followed by a person 
who wishes to exercise a right to internal appeal as granted by the ECA.70  The 
Regulations provide that any report submitted for the purposes of the regulations is a 
public document subject to the rights of its owner.71  These two provisions support 
the EIA framework as they provide interested parties with necessary means to 
participate in the EIA process.  The appeal provisions are also important that as the 
law requires, generally, that a person takes advantage of appeal provisions provided 
by statutory provisions (in this case the ECA read with its regulations) before 
                                                 
64 Regulation 6(3)(a) read with Regulation 9(1). 
65 Regulation 9 read with Regulation 8. 
66 Regulation 9(1) and (2). 
67 Regulation 9(3). 
68 Regulation 10(1). 
69 Regulation 10(2)(a) and (b). 
70 Section 35(3) of the ECA read with Regulation 11.  
71 Regulation 12. 
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approaching a court of law with a view to review and set aside an administrative 
decision taken under statutory provisions.72
 
The effect of ex post facto EIA authorisation in the current EIA 
regime 
It is clear that the provisions of the ECA and its EIA regulations are not designed to 
be applicable to activities already commenced with or completed.  Firstly, central to 
the current EIA framework is the concept of “proposed activities” and nowhere is 
reference made to current or commenced or completed activities.   
 
Secondly, to undertake an EIA on an activity that is commenced with or completed 
undermines the role of the EIA process in a decision-making process.  This is because 
the consideration of alternatives is seriously compromised as well as the role and the 
value of public participation in decision-making.  An EIA on a commenced or 
existing activity would effectively narrow the scope of the consideration of 
alternatives and of the public participation at varying degrees in each and every EIA 
process.        
 
Thirdly, that the current EIA framework does not specifically provide for an ex post 
facto EIA leads to uncertainty about what would happen when a person approaches 
the relevant authority and lodges an application with a view of undertaking an EIA 
and obtaining authorisation for an activity that is commenced with or completed.  
Because there are no legal provisions nor are any guidelines on how to deal with such 
a situation and the applicable requirements and rules, where such an EIA is 
undertaken, would be determined on a case-by-case basis.  This clearly amounts to 
legislating for disaster in the same way defines by Fuller and discussed above. 
 
Fourthly, it seems that the current EIA framework was based on the idea that it is 
sufficient to make it an offence to undertake an identified activity without requisite 
                                                 
72 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000, makes this a statutory requirement.  See section 
? 
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EIA authorisation.  This idea misses a point made by Allott that “a law cannot compel 
action.  No one can be forced to do anything merely by law … even if the law is 
accompanied by a sanction.  All a law can do is to try to induce someone … to a 
certain cause of action.”73  Accordingly, and in line with Allott’s point, it is submitted 
that the current EIA framework had to provide, adequately, for a situation where there 
is non-compliance with the requirement to obtain an authorisation before 
commencing with an identified activity.      
 
Making it an offence to breach the requirement to obtain an EIA authorisation before 
commencing with an identified activity is essential but is not sufficient on its own to 
deal with the issue of what happens once an activity has been commenced without the 
requisite EIA authorisation.  The penalties that may be imposed are also important.  
The penalties that are set out in the ECA are dated but are now complemented by the 
provisions of section 34 of the NEMA as discussed above.  This potentially provides 
an effective punitive mechanism.    
 
To the current EIA framework’s credit, the provisions of section 31A of the ECA are 
applicable to a situation where there is non-compliance with the requirement to obtain 
an EIA authorisation before an identified activity is commenced with.  Section 31A 
provides that, if it in the opinion of the authorities listed in the provision, “an person 
performs any activity or fails to perform any activity as a result of which the 
environment is or may be seriously damaged, endangered or detrimentally affected” 
any of the listed authorities may issue a written directive to such a person.74   The 
listed authorities are: the Minister of the Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the 
competent authority, a local authority or a government institution concerned.75
 
A listed authority may issue a directive to the person concerned to cease the activity 
in question, or to take appropriate steps, within a specified period with a view to deal 
                                                 
73 Anthony Allott, “The Limits of Law”, Butterworths, 1980, pages 45 to 46.  
74 Section 31A(1). 
75 Section 31A(1). 
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with the damage, danger or detrimental effect of the activity.76   The activities which 
trigger the requirement to undertake an EIA before authorisation are such that, by 
nature, they are some of the activities that may significantly affect the environment.  
In this regard, in respect of all identified activities, the Minister has already expressed 
a view that their undertaking may detrimentally affect the environment since section 
21 provides that the Minister may “identify those activities which in his opinion may 
have a substantial detrimental effect on the environment.”   
 
It is clear that an authority acting in terms of the provisions of section 31A(1) may 
order a person who has commenced with an activity without the requisite EIA 
authorisation to cease that activity.  It is also clear that, where such an activity has 
been completed, a listed authority may order the demolition of constructed structures 
or the taking of other steps “with a view to eliminating, reducing or preventing the 
damage, danger or detrimental effect.”   
 
What is not clear, however, is whether, in any of those circumstances, can a listed 
authority order the undertaking of an ex post facto EIA as part of the directive?  A 
positive answer, in this regard, would be supported by the argument that the 
discretion given to a listed authority by the provisions of section 31A(1) are 
sufficiently wide to require the undertaking of an EIA since a listed authority may 
order the person concerned “to take such steps as the Minister, competent authority, 
local authority or government institution … may deem fit.”  It is argued that this 
argument is correct.  A proviso in this regard is that the wide nature of the powers that 
are given to a listed authority is limited by the purpose of the provisions of section 
31A which is to deal with a threat posed by an activity to the environment.  Such 
powers are exercised for that purpose which does not include powers to authorise an 
activity that requires an EIA before commencement.  The prohibition of the 
undertaking of these activities and their authorisation is provided for by the 
provisions of section 22(1) as discussed above.  In my view, it would be absurd to 
interpret the ECA as implicitly providing for authorization powers under section 31A. 
                                                 
76 Section 31A(1)(a) and (b). 
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Furthermore, to allow the granting of an ex post facto authorisation in the context of 
exercising powers under the provisions of section 31A would seriously undermine the 
current EIA framework.  This is because these powers are reactive in nature whereas 
the powers given under section 22(1) are proactive as they are exercised before the 
activity commences.  Were the powers given under the provisions of section 31A to 
be utilised for the granting of an EIA authorisation it might lead to abuse by persons 
who would commence activities without the requisite authorisation with a hope that 
they would not be caught by the authorities and that, even if they are caught, they 
would be required to undertake an ex post facto EIA after which an authorisation 
might be granted to them.   
 
In addition, to utilise the provisions of section 31A to grant ex post facto EIA 
authorisations is not ideal since some of the listed authorities are not competent to 
issue an EIA authorisation.  Leaving aside the issue of whether an ex post facto EIA 
authorisation may be granted or not, local authorities and other government 
institutions that may utilise the provisions of section 31A are not competent to utilise 
the provisions of section 22(1) to grant an EIA authorisation.  In the current EIA 
framework, such powers are exercised by the Minister and the MECs responsible for 
environmental affairs in different provinces, or by official to whom these powers are 
delegated by the Minister or an MEC.                           
 
The powers that all listed authorities have are to direct the person to whom a directive 
has been issued to perform any activity or function with a view to rehabilitate any 
damage caused to the environment as a result of the activity.77  If a listed authority is 
of the view that the person concerned has failed to perform an activity or function, it 
may perform such activity or function and may authorise any person to take all steps 
required for that purpose and may recover its expenditure from the person 
concerned.78    
                                                 
77 Section 31A(2). 
78 Section 31A(3) and (4). 
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Section 28 of the NEMA contains provisions that are similar to the provisions of 
section 31A of the ECA.  These two sets of provisions apply side-by-side since the 
coming into effect of the NEMA.  The NEMA provisions will not be discussed here 
save to point out that they give similar powers to certain authorities as given under 
the provisions of section 31A of the ECA.  The NEMA provisions also do not provide 
for the granting of ex post facto EIA authorisation.  Both provisions complement the 
penalty provisions of the ECA and the provisions applicable in criminal proceedings 
in terms of section 34 of NEMA.  This is subject to a proviso that it is not an offence 
to contravene the provisions of section 28 of NEMA or a failure to comply with a 
directive under section 28(4). 
 
These enforcement powers (discussed above) depend on the relevant authorities being 
aware of the offending activity betrays the limited nature of these powers.  The law 
does not provide guidance on whether an offending party may approach a competent 
authority for guidance.  This is because the law is not clear on whether, if such a 
person does not have an EIA authorization, an ex post facto EIA authorization may be 
granted in appropriate circumstances.    
      
Case law on ex post facto authorization 
Below I deal with how courts have treated the issue of ex post facto EIA and 
(possible) authorization when it came before them. 
 
The first reported case that dealt with the issue of ex post facto EIA is Silvermine 
Valley Coalition v Sybrand van der Spuy Boerderye and Others79 which case was 
decided on 20 June 2001. 
  
The applicant was a voluntary organisation comprising ten non-governmental 
organisations (“NGOs”) while the first and second respondents, respectively, were 
                                                 
79 2002 (1) SA 478 (C). 
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lessee and lessor of the site in Simonstown, Cape Town.80  The first respondent 
commenced with earthworks in preparation for the planting of a vineyard on a site 
that, at least, since 1945, had been quarried for gravel.81  One of the NGOs which was 
later to be part of the applicant requested the first respondent to undertake an EIA and 
threatened legal action in the event that the request was not complied with.82  This 
request elicited a letter from the first respondent’s attorneys informing the NGO that 
the first respondent was proceeding with the establishment of the proposed vineyard 
and stated that the first respondent had appointed its attorneys to accept service of any 
application.83  
 
About a year later, applicant’s attorneys addressed another letter to the first 
respondent’s attorneys in which they threatened to institute interdictory proceedings 
against the first respondent.84  Following a response from the first respondent’s 
attorneys reiterating the entitlement of the first respondent to establish a vineyard and 
informing the applicant that the vineyard had already been planted, the applicant 
instituted court proceedings. 
 
The applicant approached the court for an order that forcing the first respondent be 
ordered to undertake an EIA in terms of the ECA or, alternatively, in terms of the 
policy determined in terms of the ECA or, further alternatively, in terms of the 
provisions of the NEMA, in respect of the planting of a vineyard and the constriction 
of dams.85
 
 The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and concluded that: 
 
“When this legislative framework is analysed in its complex totality, it becomes clear 
that an EIA fits in the scheme which has been set up to ensure that an official 
                                                 
80 pages 479 to 480. 
81 page 479. 
82 Page 480. 
83 Page 480. 
84 Page 480. 
85 Page 479. 
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approval is granted before certain land can be put specific uses as defined … It would 
appear that, in general, a person who performs an identified activity unlawfully 
without authorization cannot be forced to comply with a procedure applicable to one 
who has in fact sought authorization.  The unlawfulness of the conduct determines the 
remedy.”86   
 
Further, the court reasoned that the current EIA regime does not envisage that an EIA 
can be wrenched from its particular purpose as conceived in the legislative structure 
and be employed “as an independent remedy.”87  The remedies that are available 
where a person undertook an identified activity without an EIA are based on both 
civil law and criminal law.  In respect of the former, there may be a mandatory 
interdict or a prohibitory interdict, and, in respect of the latter, there may be criminal 
prosecution and an order to repair damages to the environment.88    
 
The court, therefore, refused to grant the relief sought on the basis that it would have 
no legal significance.89
 
It is argued that the court decision is correct in holding that the current EIA regime is 
applicable to activities that have not taken place.  The court pronounced this as a 
general principle as it used the term “generally” in pronouncing the legal position. 
What are the exceptions to this general rule?  The court did not pronounce on this as 
it was not necessary for the case that the court had to decide.   
 
Furthermore, it is clear that, whatever the exceptions are, the facts of the case did not 
fit any of the exceptions nor was there any need to consider any of them.  It is argued 
that the exceptions that the court implicitly referred to had to be explored and 
properly conceptualized in subsequent cases.  This, unfortunately, did not happen. 
 
                                                 
86 Page 488. 
87 Page 488. 
88 Page 488. 
89 Page 488. 
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In addition to the remedies that the court mentioned which are available where a 
person has undertaken an identified activity without an EIA, there are statutory 
remedies provided by the ECA and the NEMA. Powers are given to various 
authorities to issue an order (directive) against any person (including an owner of 
land and any person who has a right to use the land) who causes, has caused, or, may 
cause significant or serious harm to the environment.90  Most identified activities, if 
not all, may at least cause significant or serious harm to the environment and the 
authorities with these powers may issue a directive against offenders, subject to 
compliance with procedural requirements. 
 
The second reported case is the decision in Eagles Landing Body Corporate v 
Molewa NO and Others91  Judgment on this case was handed down, by the Transvaal 
Provincial Division on 22 March 2002. 
 
The applicant was the body corporate of the Tradewinds Sectional Title Scheme and 
the first and second respondents were, respectively, the MEC for, and the head of, the 
North West provincial department of environmental affairs (the “department”).92  The 
third respondent was a golf estate developer.93  The third respondent commenced 
construction of a peninsula (as part of the golf estate) and the department issued a 
directive, in terms of the NEMA, directing the third respondent to cease the 
earthworks and undertake an EIA.94  The third respondent complied and was, 
eventually, granted an authorization to continue with the construction.95  The 
applicant, unsuccessfully, appealed against the decision authorizing the continuation 
of the construction and construction was continued and completed.96  The applicant 
then approached the High Court to review and set aside the decision. 
 
The order sought was to: 
                                                 
90 The powers in NEMA are given in section 28 and the powers in the ECA are given in section 31A. 
91 2003 (1) 412. 
92 Page 416. 
93 Page 416. 
94 Page 416. 
95 Page 416. 
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• declare that the decision authorizing the construction was contrary to the 
doctrine of legality or that it was ultra vires the provisions of section 22 of 
the ECA as it purported to grant an ex post facto authorization; 
• set aside the decision on appeal and replacing it by a decision upholding the 
appeal, denying the application for authorization; and 
• declare that the construction took place without the necessary authorization 
in terms of section 22 of the ECA and is unlawful.                              
 
The court held that granting the order sought by the applicant would have no practical 
effect since the construction had been completed.97  On this basis the court refused to 
grant the order sought by applicant.98  The court nevertheless furnished its views on 
other issues in the matter. 
 
With respect to the issue of whether an ex post facto EIA authorization may be 
granted under the provisions of section 22 of the ECA, the court expressed a view that 
the law did not permit the granting of an ex post facto authorization.99  In this regard, 
the court agreed with the argument of counsel for applicant in that, in terms of the 
ECA, “authorization for any identified activity must precede the undertaking of the 
activity” but expressed a view that it was unable to uphold that argument to the facts 
of the case before court.100  The court expressed a view, agreeing with counsel for the 
third respondent, that it was never the intention of the Legislature that authorization 
could never be given for the completion of construction in every case where some 
construction had been undertaken without EIA authorization.101  In this regard, it is 
noted that the intention of the Legislature is clear in that it intended all activities that 
trigger the requirement to undertake an EIA to be undertaken after an EIA 
authorisation had been granted.  To intend otherwise, it is submitted, would have 
defeated, or at least undermined, the purpose of the EIA regime.   
                                                                                                                                                 
96 Page 416. 
97 Page 432. 
98 Page 432. 
99 Page 433. 
100 Page 443. 
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The court expressed a view that: 
 
“Provided that the authorization for the completion of the partially undertaken 
activity is the result of a proper compliance with the provisions, and the environment 
protection and preservation objectives, of the environmental legislation, it will, in my 
judgment, constitute a valid authorization.  The circumstance that unauthorized 
partially undertaken activity would thereby in effect be legitimated would be no more 
than an incidental result of the authorization granted.”102
 
The court noted held that the above proviso applied in the circumstances of the case 
and that there was no other concern raised in respect of the authorization other than 
the fact the construction was partially undertaken.103
 
There are few points to note in this judgment.  Firstly, the court’s views do not create 
a binding precedent.  It is trite law that a precedent is created by a court’s reasoning in 
reaching (its) decision.  The court’s reasoning in this case was that the order sought 
would have no practical value to the applicant and hence the court decided not to 
grant the order.  Hence the court’s views discussed above were merely obiter dicta, 
that is, they only have persuasive value.  Secondly, the court did not refer to the 
Silvermine judgment notwithstanding that it was decided a year earlier.  While the 
Silvermine judgment was not binding on the court in the Transvaal Provincial 
Division it had persuasion value as it dealt, broadly, with the question of whether an 
ex post facto EIA authorisation may be granted. The court in the Eagles Landing case 
could have built on the jurisprudence of the Silvermine judgment by, possibly, 
pronouncing the circumstances of the case before it as falling within one of the 
exceptions to the general rule that an ex post facto EIA authorization cannot be 
granted.  Doing so would have been possible, especially, because in both judgments 
the court held that the current EIA regime applies to activities not yet undertaken.   
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Thirdly, the court’s view that an ex post fact EIA authorization would be valid where 
granting it for a partially undertaken activity is “the result of a proper compliance 
with the provisions, the environment protection and preservation objectives, of the 
environmental legislation” is problematic. If one agrees with the court’s view in the 
Silvermine judgment then the legal position is that the current EIA regime does not 
provide for the granting of an ex post facto EIA authorization and the court’s view, in 
this regard, therefore does not help.  In addition, commencing an identified activity 
without authorization is against environmental legislation and to authorize the 
completion of such an activity seems, logically, to be against the provisions of the 
environmental legislation.  In fact, the court’s view, shows that the ECA’s dealing 
with the issue of ex post facto authorisation is exactly what Fuller called a legal 
system in the Pickwickian sense where a void contract is said to be some kind of a 
valid contract.  
 
Fourthly, the court, by holding that an EIA authorization must precede the 
commencement of identified activity and then indicating that there may be 
circumstances where this proposition cannot be applied, it is submitted, implied that 
the granting of an ex post facto authorization is an exception to the general rule.  This 
is crucial because it means that there is commonality between the Silvermine 
judgment and the Eagles Landing judgment in so far as both courts implied that the 
granting of an ex post facto EIA authorisation is an exception to a general rule.             
 
The question of ex post facto EIA authorization was also, briefly, dealt with in a 2005 
unreported case of Capital Park Motors CC and Another v Shell South Africa 
Marketing (Pty) Ltd and Others.104  The substance of the case, however, was not 
about whether such an authorization may be granted or not.  I will only deal with 
those aspects which relate to the issue of ex post facto authorisation.   
 
                                                 
104 Case number 3016/2005 of the Transvaal Provincial Division.   
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The first respondent commenced with, and completed, the construction of a filling 
station and associated infrastructure in 2001.105  The first respondent was convicted 
for the unlawful construction and fined an amount of R10,000.00.106  With a view of 
rectifying the unlawfulness of the construction, the first respondent applied for an 
authorization in terms of the ECA and application was unsuccessful.107  The first 
respondent then lodged an appeal, in terms of section 35 of the ECA, against the 
refusal of authorization which appeal was pending at the time of the court decision.108  
Operation of the constructed petrol filling station started on 28 January 2005 and 
prompted a demand, by applicants, for an undertaking that the first respondent will 
desist from operating pending the undertaking of further steps.109  The undertaking 
was not given.110  The applicants then approached the court for a relief.   
 
The order sought by the applicants was an interim interdict against the first and/or 
fifth respondents to stop the operation of the petrol filling station pending the 
finalisation of the appeal lodged in terms of section 35 of the ECA, other steps set out 
in the relief.111
 
The court referred to the Eagles Landing case and held that that case was not 
authority for a proposition that granting an ex post facto EIA authorization was 
impossible.112  The court held that the pronouncements made by the court in the 
Eagles Landing case were merely obiter and that, in addition, the court expressed a 
view that such an authorization can be given.113  Pointing out that the judgment in the 
Eagles Landing case dealt with a partially completed activity, the court held that the 
court’s views in that case were obiter in relation to a completed activity and that, 
further, if an ex post facto authorization could be granted for a partially completed 
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activity there is no reason why it could not be given for a completed activity.114  The 
pending appeal, the court held, was not a dead letter because an ex post facto 
authorization could be granted.115  The court therefore granted the order sought by the 
applicant.116    
 
The court decision is problematic in a number of ways.  The court stated that the 
Eagles Landing judgment had persuasive value in so far as the court pronounced on 
the possibility of granting an ex post facto authorization.  I agree with this.  But what 
the court did not attach sufficient importance on is that the essence of the persuasive 
value in the Eagles Landing judgment is that the view that an ex post facto 
authorization may not be granted as it is not provided for by the current EIA regime.  
In the Eagles Landing judgment, the court intimated that that was a general rule 
which rule could not be applied in the circumstances of the case before it.  It is 
submitted that this is the crux of the persuasive value in the Silvermine judgment.  
 
Furthermore, the court noted that the Eagles Landing judgment was concerned with a 
partially undertaken construction and, then, stated that the judgment had persuasive 
value for completed activities.  I agree with the court in this regard.  Based on this, 
the court concluded that if an ex post facto authorization may be granted for a 
partially undertaken activity there is no reason why it cannot be granted for a 
completed activity.  The court does not elaborate on this.  The crux of the problem 
here is that there are no clearly defined requirements for exceptional circumstances 
where an ex post facto authorisation would be lawfully granted.  The court merely 
states that if such an authorisation may be granted for partially undertaken activities 
there is no reason why it should not be granted for completed activities.  Other than 
this pronouncement, the court did not make any contribution in the development of 
the jurisprudence on ex post facto authorisation.  It did not consider the Silvermine 
case which, as is discussed above, is authority that, generally, an ex post facto 
authorization cannot be granted.  In considering the Silvermine case, the court could 
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have developed principles with respect to the exceptions which are applicable to this 
general rule.  The court did, however, express a view that operating from a facility 
that is constructed without an environmental authorization was unlawful because “the 
prohibition against construction/erection is aimed at not being able to have or utilize 
such prohibited activity.  Otherwise the whole prohibition becomes 
nugatory/redundant.”117  
 
Conclusions on the position of the current EIA regime 
It is clear that the general rule, in terms of the current EIA framework is that an ex 
post facto EIA authorization is not provided for.  It is also clear that the de minimus 
principle applies to this general rule which principle, in this context, states that a 
trivial activity may be authorized notwithstanding that it has been commenced with at 
the time authorization is granted.  What is not clear is what other exceptions are 
applicable to this general rule.  Courts have not been helpful in developing principles 
in this regard. It may be that this is because the courts have never been called upon to 
specifically circumscribe the ambit of these exceptions. Conceivably, that there is no 
clarity on the exceptions has not helped DEAT and various provincial departments of 
environmental affairs in appreciating the ambit of their powers in their decisions that 
relate to partially undertaken or completed activities which require EIA authorization.     
 
Furthermore, because the courts have not been specifically called upon to specifically 
circumscribe the ambit of the exceptions to the general rule that an ex post facto EIA 
authorization may be granted, the courts have not referred to nor have they sought 
any guidance from international law and foreign law.  None of the judgments 
discussed above referred to, or quoted from, any international or foreign sources.  
This is not withstanding that South African environmental law, like domestic 
environmental laws of most countries, has been heavily influenced by international 
law.118  While this point is made, it is submitted that, criticism of the courts in this 
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regard would be unfair since, it seems that, interpreting and applying the relevant 
provisions of South African law and applicable principles was sufficient to dispose of 
the respective disputes that the courts were called upon to adjudicate.   
 
It is argued that the manner in which the issue of ex post facto EIA authorisation was 
legislated for in the current EIA framework fitted one or more of the ways of 
legislating for disaster which are referred to above.  One, there was a failure on the 
part of the legislature to create rules for an ex post facto situation.  As a result, every 
ex post facto situation had to be decided on an ad hoc basis as the cases discussed 
here confirm.  Two, because no rules were created on ex post facto EIA 
authorisations, there was no publication of applicable rules so that citizens become 
aware of the applicable rules.  As a result of this, there has been confusion in society 
on this issue.  Three, in so far as the courts expressed a view that an ex post facto EIA 
authorisation may be granted in certain circumstances without creating or identifying 
applicable rules, it is argued that is the symptom of a failure of congruence between 
the law and its actual administration. 
  
Based on the above argument, it is submitted that, the manner in which the question 
of ex post facto EIA authorisation in the current EIA framework has been legislated 
for is a disaster.  Below I consider whether international law and foreign law provide 
any guidance on how to deal with the issue of ex post facto EIA authorization with 






CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Introduction 
There are seven traditional sources of international law.  These are: international 
conventions or treaties, customary law, general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations, judicial precedent, text writings by experts on international law, 
codification and Jus Cogens.119  International conventions or treaties and customary 
international law are recognized as the primary sources providing substantive content 
on those aspects dealing with environmental law.120  In addition to these traditional 
sources of international law, ‘soft law’ plays a significant role in developing 
international law, by pointing to the direction of formally binding obligations, even 
though it is not binding in itself.121 Examples of ‘soft law’ include the Rio 
Declaration and the Stockholm Declaration.122
 
I proceed below by considering whether ex post facto EIA authorizations are provided 
for by some of these sources of international law.  Logically, this consideration is 
preceded by considering whether EIAs are required or provided for in the sources 
considered.     
 
Rio Declaration 
The first source of international law to be considered is the 1992 Rio Declaration.  
One of the principles of the Rio Declaration states that EIA “as a national instrument 
shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national 
authority.”123  As indicated above, soft law is not binding per se, rather, it points to 
the direction of the law.  The principle is accordingly important.   
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There are few points to note in this regard.  Firstly, the principle requires states to 
establish national EIA regimes.  Secondly, such EIA regime must be applicable to 
activities that are likely to have significant adverse impact on the environment and are 
subject to a decision of a competent national authority.   
 
Thirdly, the principle clearly requires that an EIA to be undertaken before an activity 
is undertaken as it refers to ‘proposed activities.’  Fourthly, the principle does not 
state that there is an exception where an EIA may be undertaken after the activity has 
been undertaken and that authorization may be granted in that situation.  It is 
submitted that, while the Rio Declaration, gives an indication that EIAs must precede 
the undertaking of activities, it does not answer the question of whether an EIA may 
be taken after the activity has been partially undertaken or completed.       
 
1991 Espoo Convention 
The 1991 United Nations Economic Community for Europe Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, which is also known 
as the 1991 Espoo Convention, is the another source of international law that I 
consider which makes reference to EIAs.  As the name of the Espoo Convention 
indicates, it is applicable in a transboundary context and was adopted under the 
auspices of the Economic Community for Europe. 
 
Among others, the Espoo Convention records a commitment of the signatory states to 
take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant 
adverse transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities.124  A Party in 
which an activity is planned which activity is likely to cause a significant adverse 
transboundary impact, referred to as Party of origin in the Convention, is obliged to 
inform affected Parties and discussions must take place between concerned parties.125   
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It is important to note how the Convention defines the terms “impact” and 
“transboundary impact” as these terms are central to the EIA regime that the 
Convention establishes.  The Convention defines “impact” widely as including: 
“any effect caused by a proposed activity on the environment including human health 
and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments 
or other physical structures or the interaction among these factors; it also includes 
effects on cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to 
those factors.”126
 
Transboundary impact is defined as “any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, 
within an area under the jurisdiction of a party caused by a proposed activity the 
physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part which the area of jurisdiction of 
another party.”127
 
Both definitions indicate that the Convention envisages EIA in the context of 
activities which are yet to take place as they use the phrase ‘proposed activities.’  This 
argument is supported by the fact that the Convention requires the Party of origin to 
ensure that an EIA is undertaken ‘prior to a decision to authorize or undertake a 
proposed activity listed … that is likely to cause significant adverse transboundary 
impact.’128
 
The Convention, therefore, does not contain provisions which explicitly indicate that 
it may be used in a case of ex post facto authorization.  The whole focus of the 
Convention is on activities which are proposed and which are likely to have 
significant transboundary impacts.  Although the Convention is an important 
international instrument on EIAs, it does not provide any help on how to deal with the 
situation of ex post facto authorization.  Below, I consider foreign law experience, 
specifically, whether it provides any guidance on the issue of ex post facto 
authorization.             
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     CHAPTER 5: FOREIGN LAW 
Introduction 
It is always advisable to treat foreign law with caution when considering it with a 
view of ascertaining its position on a particular aspect.  This is because domestic law 
functions as a system with various aspects inextricably intertwined together.  
Understanding a particular aspect, no matter how insignificant it may be, generally, 
requires the understanding of the whole system or, at least, its inter-related aspects.  
The domestic laws of countries that are discussed in this dissertation are no different 
from other domestic laws in this regard.  The only reason the domestic laws of these 
countries are considered here is to ascertain how they deal with the issue of ex post 
facto EIA authorisation.  I do not, in this dissertation, consider the entire domestic 
legal system of these countries in order to ascertain this.  I am of the view that 
considering EIA laws of these countries is sufficient for the purposes of ascertaining 
how these countries deal with the issue of ex post facto authorisation.   
 
Canada 
In Canada, EIAs are provided for in a separate statute which statute deals only with 
EIAs and related matters.  This is unlike the South African situation where EIAs are 
provided for in a general environmental management statute, namely the ECA or 
NEMA.  The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act129 (“CEAA”) came into effect 
in 1995.        
 
The provisions of the CEAA do not use the phrase “environmental impact 
assessment” or EIA as it is the case in the ECA.  Instead, the CEAA uses the phrase 
“environmental assessment” (“EA”) which is defined as “in respect of a project, an 
assessment of the environmental effects of the project that is conducted in accordance 
with this Act”.130  This definition is in line with the approach adopted by Glazewski 
that the term EA covers both EIAs which targets projects specifically and “strategic 
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environmental assessments” which covers the assessment of policies, programmes 
and plans.131   The use of the introductory words “in respect to a project” in the 
definition recognises this otherwise wide meaning of the phrase.  The net effect of the 
definition, however, is that the phrase, as used in the CEAA, has the same meaning as 
an EIA.  Hence, to avoid confusion, I use the EIA instead of EA notwithstanding that 
the CEAA refers to the latter. 
 
The importance of EIAs in Canada is emphasized by Boyd when he stated that 
“Environmental Assessment, as described by the Supreme Court of Canada, is “a 
planning tool that is now generally regarded as an integral component of sound 
decision-making”” and it involves gathering and evaluating information about the 
potential impacts of a proposed course of action, and integrating environmental and 
economic factors in order to produce sustainable development.132
   
The purposes of the CEAA include ensuring that environmental impacts are 
considered before actions are taken.133  There are two kinds of EIA processes that 
may be undertaken in terms of the CEAA, namely a screening process or a 
comprehensive study.  The term “screening” is defined as an EIA “that is conducted 
pursuant to section 18 and that includes a consideration of the factors set out in 
subsection 16(1),”134 while a “comprehensive study” is defined as an EIA “that is 
conducted pursuant to sections 21 and 21.1, and includes a consideration of the 
factors required to be considered pursuant to subsections 16(1) and (2).”135  The 
factors that are considered in every screening process or comprehensive study are: 
• the environmental effects of the project, including the environmental effects of 
malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the project and any 
cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result from the project in 
combination with other projects or activities that have been  or will be carried out; 
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• the significance of the effects set out above; 
• comments from the public that are received in accordance with the provisions of 
the CEAA; 
• measures that are technically and economically feasible and that would mitigate 
an any significant adverse environmental effects of the project; and 
• any other matter relevant to the screening or comprehensive study, such as the 
need for the project and alternatives to the project, that the responsible authority 
or, except in the case of screening, the Minister after consulting with the 
responsible authority, may require to be considered.136 
    
In addition, a comprehensive study includes a consideration of the factors set out 
below: 
• the purpose of the project; 
• alternative means of carrying out the project that are technically and economically 
feasible and the environmental effects of any such alternative means; 
• the need for, and the requirements of, any follow-up programme in respect of the 
project; and 
• the capacity of renewable resources that are likely to be significantly affected by 
the project to meet the needs of the present and those of the future generations.137  
 
The term “project” is also crucial in the EIA regime created by the CEAA.  This term 
is defined as: 
a) in relation to a physical work, any proposed construction, operation, modification, 
decommissioning, abandonment or other undertaking in relation to that physical 
work, or 
b) any proposed physical activity not relating to a physical work that is prescribed or 
is within a class  of physical activities that is prescribed or is within a class of 
physical activities that is prescribed pursuant to regulations.138 
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The provisions set out directly above are similar to the provisions of the current South 
African EIA framework in so far as they clearly envisage that an EIA must be 
undertaken before an activity is undertaken as they refer to “proposed” activity.     
 
The CEAA provides that EIA is required “before a federal authority exercises one of 
the following powers or performs one of the following duties or functions of a 
project, namely, where a federal authority 
(a) is the proponent of the project and does any act or thing that commits the 
federal authority to carrying out the project in whole or in part; 
(b) makes or authorizes payments or provides a guarantee for a loan or any 
other form of financial assistance to the proponent for the purpose of 
enabling the project to be carried out in whole or in part, except where the 
financial assistance is in the form of any reduction, avoidance, deferral, 
removal, refund, remission, or other form of relief from the payment of 
any tax, duty or impost imposed under any Act of Parliament, unless that 
financial assistance is provided for the purpose of enabling an individual 
project specifically named in the Act, regulation or order that provides the 
relief to be carried out; 
(c) has the administration of federal lands and sells, leases or otherwise 
disposes of those lands or any interests in those lands, or transfers the 
administration and control of those lands or interests to Her Majesty in 
right of a province, for the purpose of enabling the project to be carried 
out in whole or in part; or 
(d) under a provision prescribed pursuant to paragraph 59(f), issues a permit 
or licence, grants an approval or takes any other action for the purpose of 
enabling the project to be carried out in whole or in part.”139  
 
Important to note from this quote is that the projects that fall within the first two 
categories set out are public projects in a sense that they are either undertaken by a 
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federal authority or that they are supported by public funds.  The third category 
involves the provision of public land with a view of facilitating the project.  The 
fourth category provides for EIA in private projects where they require authorization 
from a federal authority. 
 
The CEAA also provides for the exclusion of certain activities from the requirements 
to undertake an EIA.  Activities are excluded, among others, if they are: included in 
an exclusion list;140 to be carried out in response to an emergency and carrying out 
the project forthwith is in the interest of preventing damage to property for which 
special temporary measures are being taken under the Emergencies Act.141  
 
Where required an EIA is required the federal authority must ensure that it is 
conducted as early as possible during the planning phase of the project and before 
irrevocable decisions are taken.142 This is clearly at odds with an ex post facto EIA.  
It has also been stated that the idea behind the EPAA is that an EIA should be an 
inherent part of the whole process of decision-making, starting as soon as a proposal 
is first mooted and, as such, an EIA “was not something to be simply tacked on after 
a decision had already been made to proceed on economic and/or social grounds.”143  
As such, “an environmentally harmful activity should never reach the stage where so 
much time and energy had been invested that it was impossible to back down.”144
 
Activities which trigger the application of a screening process are those that are not 
described in the comprehensive study list or in the exclusion list.145  Involved in the 
screening process is the screening itself and the preparation of a report for submission 
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to the responsible authority.146  Public participation depends on whether the 
responsible authority deems it appropriate or the regulations require it.147  
 
A comprehensive study is triggered by an activity which is listed in a comprehensive 
study list.148  In respect to a comprehensive study, the responsible authority must 
ensure public consultation with respect to the proposed scope of the project, the 
factors proposed to be considered in the EIA, the proposed scope of those factors and 
the ability of the comprehensive study to address issues relating to the project.149   
 
The CEAA does not specifically deal with the question of ex post facto authorisation.  
Its provisions are clear that they are designed to locate an EIA before an activity takes 
place.  It is submitted that this situation is the same as the current South African EIA 
framework.  As such, the CEAA does not provide any guidance on how to deal with 
the issue of ex post facto authorisation.  In this regard it is important to consider a 
case where a court ordered the undertaking of an ex post facto EIA, albeit, before the 
CEAA came into operation. 
 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) 
The Canadian Supreme Court gave a judgment in 1992 in the case of Friends of the 
Oldman River Society v Canada150 (parties were cited as per the court of first 
instance) which judgment referred to the issue of ex post facto EIA. The respondent 
was an environmental group based in Alberta and brought an application for a 
certiorari and mandamus in the Federal Court which sought to compel certain federal 
departments to conduct an EIA in terms of the federal Environmental Assessment and 
Review Process Guidelines Order, in respect of a dam constructed on the Oldman 
River by the province of Alberta.151  The project of constructing a dam affected 
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several federal interests, specifically navigable waters, fisheries, Indians and Indian 
lands.152
 
Construction of the Dam was 40 per cent complete when the respondent commenced 
the court proceedings in the Federal Court.153  The applications were dismissed and 
the respondent lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal which was successful and 
the approval for the project was quashed and the Ministers of Transport and of 
Fisheries and Oceans were ordered to comply with the Guidelines Order.154  The 
applicants lodged an appeal against this decision with the Supreme Court. 
 
The appeal in the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of the Guidelines Order 
as well as its nature and applicability and, further, whether the Court of Appeal 
properly exercised its discretion in deciding not to grant the remedy sought on the 
grounds of unreasonable delay and futility.155      
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal but decided not to issue a mandamus 
directing the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to comply with the Guidelines 
Order.156  It is submitted that the decision of the court not to issue a mandamus in this 
regard had no substantive effect on the outcome of the case.  This is because Alberta 
province required to undertake an EIA before it could be granted an approval from 
the Minister of Transport under section 5 of the Navigable Waters Protection Act.  
Hence, that the decision of the court not to issue a mandamus is insignificant since the 
decision of the Court of Appeal quashing the section 5 approval was confirmed. 
 
The rationale for the decision of the Supreme Court is, largely, not relevant to the 
issue of ex post facto EIA authorization.  The aspect that is relevant is that the court 
interpreted the relevant provisions of the Guidelines Order creatively to hold that they 
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were not applicable to new projects only.157  In this regard, the court considered the 
provisions of the Act in terms of which the Guidelines Order was enacted and held 
because the provisions of section 6 of the Act provide that the Guidelines Order 
applied to “any proposal … that may have an environmental effect on an area of 
federal responsibility” the Guidelines Order was not confined to new project and, as 
such, it applied to the Oldman River Dam Project notwithstanding that it had already 
been partially undertaken.158  Furthermore, the court held that: 
 
“ … it is not at all obvious that the implementation of the Guidelines Order even at 
this late stage (where 40 per cent of the project had been completed) will not have 
some influence over the mitigative measures that may be taken to ameliorate any 
deleterious environmental impact from the dam on an area of federal jurisdiction.”159              
 
As a result of the judgment of the Supreme Court an EIA was undertaken in respect 
of the Oldman River Dam Project notwithstanding the fact that the project was 40 per 
cent complete.  The judgment treated an ex post facto EIA, and logically 
authorization thereafter, as clearly provided for and did not categorise it as an 
exception to the general rule.  The judgment provides no guidance on how to deal 
with the issue.  Instead, it highlights the role of the courts in any jurisdiction in 
applying statutory provisions in a just and fair manner in the circumstances of the 
case before it.  It is unclear what is the role of this judgment in ex post facto 
authorization situations in Canada since the judgment preceded the CEAA which 
clearly requires an EIA and authorization to precede commencement of a project.  
Interestingly, the CEAA does not specifically deal with the issue in light of the 
Supreme Court decision.     
 
Finally, it is important to note that, in respect of the EIA that was subsequently 
undertaken for the Oldman River Dam Project, Boyd states that, “the experts who 
conducted the court-ordered EA recommended that the dam not be completed, but 
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their recommendations were ignored.”160  This clearly shows that there is a limit to 
what environmental laws, as enforced by the courts, can achieve in any society, and 
not only in South Africa. 
 
Castle-Crown Wilderness Coalition v Flett161
This is a case which concerned an EIA process under the Alberta’s EIA statute.162  
The administrative decision which was subject of this case related to a new proposal 
by a resort operator to significantly expand the existing resort.163  The resort operator 
had contacted the Director of the relevant authority about the need to submit an EIA 
for a proposed expansion and the latter reviewed the proposal and decided that an 
EIA was not required.164  The decision was based on the fact that the ski resort was 
an existing activity which had already commenced and, accordingly, was not a 
proposed activity subject to the EIA process.165  The Castle-Crown Wilderness 
Coalition requested the Minister of the relevant authority to exercise his powers under 
the EIA statute but their request was not granted.166  The Coalition then approached 
the Court167 for review and setting aside of both the Director’s and Minister’s 
administrative decision.168
 
The court addressed two main issues: the determination that the proposed expansion 
did not trigger the requirement to undertake an EIA and the decisions of the Director 
and the Minister that an EIA was not required.169  The court found that the Director 
had interpreted the EIA statute in an unjustifiably narrow manner and one of the 
Justices in the case commented that: 
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“… I assume that it was her view that because there were some buildings on the land, 
along with a ski hill that was in operation, that the activity had already commenced.  
Taking that argument to its logical conclusion, any existing recreational or tourism 
facilities could enlarge its facilities and thereby their use in any astronomical or 
tourism facilities and thereby their use in any astronomical number and, because there 
was already an existing facility in operation, their enlargement would never be 
subject to the environmental assessment process.  This cannot possibly be the correct 
interpretation of the legislation, particularly when one looks at the purpose of the 
EPBEA which is the protection of the environment, the need to balance 
environmental protection with economic factors and to prevent and mitigate the 
environmental impact of development.”170
 
The court also found that the EIA process was the only way to obtain the information 
that could answer the environmental concerns of the project and, accordingly, the 
court found that the decisions of both the Director and the Minister were patently 
unreasonable in not requiring an EIA.171
 
There are two points worth noting from this case.  The first is that the state EIA laws 
are same as those which apply through out Canada in that they do not explicitly 
provide for ex post EIA authorization.  The statute that the court was concerned with 
in this case is an example in this regard.  Secondly, the court decision was very 
creative and, it is argued, (it) stretched the provisions of the statute too far.  The court 
effectively declared that the functionaries (the Director and the Minister) have powers 
to decide EIA applications even though the provisions of the statute clearly do not 
give such powers.  This is an anomaly since, ordinarily, were the Director or the 
Minister to exercise such power decisions made would be ultra vires the provisions of 
the statute.  This is again a clear case of how the failure to legislate for ex post facto 
EIA authorization amounts to legislating for disaster.  It leaves everyone uncertain 
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too much reliance is had on the courts for interpretation.  Because of this uncertainty, 
the issue is dealt with on a case-by-case basis (which is a result of failure to achieve 
rules as indicated by Fuller) and the functionaries are reluctant to make decisions 
either way and hope to be taken to court for direction.         
 
Australia 
In Australia the EIA regime is governed by the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Act172 (the “EPBA”) which Act does not only provide for EIAs.     
 
Central to the EIA system the EPBA provides for is the term “controlled action” 
which is defined as “an action that a person proposes to take … if the taking of the 
action by the person without approval under Part 9 for purposes of a provision of Part 
3 would be prohibited by the provision.”173  Part 3 sets out a number of activities 
which activities are prohibited unless a person has obtained an approval under Part 9. 
Some of these activities, such as the taking of an action which has or will have a 
significant impact on a listed threatened species included in the extinct wild category, 
are definitively set out in Part 3.174  Part 3 provides that some of these activities are to 
be set out through the promulgation of regulations.175  Also of importance to note is 
that Part 3 stipulates civil which are applicable to situations where its provisions are 
contravened.  Part 9 provides for the powers of the Minister to make decisions 
whether to grant or refuse approval and to impose conditions where the approval is 
granted. 
 
The first step in the EPBA EIA system is the referral to the Minister of a proposal to 
undertake a controlled action.  The referral may be made by the person who proposes 
to take the action;176 or a State or a self-governing Territory;177 or a Commonwealth 
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Agency.178  Where a referral is not made by a person who proposes to undertake the 
action, the Minister must inform such person as soon as is practicable after receiving 
a referral.179  The Minister also has powers to request, from the person who intends to 
undertake an action, referral of proposal where he or she is of the view that it is a 
controlled action.180  Upon receipt of a proposal, where the Minister is satisfied that 
the action is a component of a larger action, the Minister may reject the referral and 
request the referral of a larger project.181  It is noted here that the EPBA uses the term 
“proposal” which clearly indicates that the requirement to undertake an EIA is 
applicable to an activity before it is undertaken.            
 
The second step is not applicable if the person who is proposing to take an action 
states that he or she thinks that it is a controlled action.182  This step comprises the 
Minister informing any other Minister whom he or she believes has administrative 
responsibilities relating to the proposal and requesting from such Minister 
information which is relevant in deciding whether the proposed activity is a 
controlled action or not.183  The Minister also invites comments from those Ministers 
and from the public.184     
 
The third step comprises the Minister considering referral, taking into account any 
negative and beneficial impacts of the project and public comments and then deciding 
whether a proposal referred to him or her is a controlled action.185   
 
In the fourth step the Minister decides on the assessment approach that must be used 
for the assessment of the relevant impacts of the action.186  These are the approaches 
that the Minister chooses from: assessment by an accredited assessment process; 
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assessment on preliminary documentation; assessment by public environment report; 
assessment by environmental impact statement; and, assessment by enquiry.187  The 
decision of the Minister conveyed to interested parties.188   
 
The fifth step comprises of the undertaking of the assessment in accordance with the 
decision of the Minister.  This is followed by the submission of the assessment report 
to the Minister.189   
 
In the fifth step the Minister considers the assessment report and decides whether to 
grant or refuse the proposal for the controlled action.190  Where approved, the content 
of the approval includes conditions and specification the period for which the 
approval has effect.191  The EPBA sets out penalties for the contravention of the 
conditions of the approval.192
 
It is important to note that, notwithstanding the extensive provisions of the EPBA, it 
does not provide specifically for ex post facto EIAs authorization.  It is submitted that 
the EPBA, therefore, does not provide any guidance on how to deal with the issue of 
ex post facto EIA authorization.  
 
 
Republic of Lithuania 
In the Republic of Lithuania EIA legislation is similar to that of Australia and Canada 
in not providing for ex post facto EIAs with a view to granting or refusing 
authorization.  In this country EIAs are governed by a statute titled “Law on 
Environmental Impact Assessment of the Republic of Lithuania.”193  This is clear as 
states that an environmental impact means “a probable change in environment caused 
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193 Adopted on 15 August 1996. 
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by a proposed activity”194 and that an EIA is “the process of identifying and 
predicting the potential impact of a proposed activity on the environment.”195  The 
Act also states that its aim is “to provide regulations for the evaluation of proposed 
activity which may cause negative impact on the environment.”196  This is further 
confirmed by the provisions which state that the proposed activity cannot be carried 
out if the EIA decision is negative.197  
 
Nigeria 
In Nigeria EIAs are provided for in terms of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Decree.198  The provisions of the Decree are clear in that they envisage an EIA to be 
conducted before a project is undertaken.  This is clear from its general principles of 
EIA whose objectives include to establishing before a decision is taken the extent of 
the likely effects of the activity on the environment.199  This is also clear from its 
usage of the terms it uses such as “the proponent of the project”200 and the definition 
of the term project which is defined as “a physical work that a proponent proposes to 
construct, operate, modify, decommission, abandon or otherwise carry out or a 
physical activity that a proponent proposes to undertake or otherwise carry out.”201   
 
The Decree contains no provisions which suggest that an ex post facto authorization 
may be considered and that an authorization may be granted in that regard. 
 
Northern Ireland 
There are a number of specific EIA laws in Northern Ireland.  One of these laws 
comprises the Roads (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations (Northern 
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196 Article 2. 
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198 No. 86 of 1992. 
199 Section 1(a). 
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Ireland) 1999 which are made under the European Communities Act202 and deals 
specifically with EIAs in the context of roads.  The Regulations are made in an 
attempt to comply with relevant European Council Directives.203  They apply to those 
activities which fall within the Annexures to the Directives and “in respect of those 
proposals to construct new roads and to improve roads.”204
 
The Regulations are designed to apply to activities before they commence.  In this 
regard, the term “relevant project” is defined as “a project for constructing or 
improving a road where the area of the proposed works” exceeds 1 hectare, or is 
situated in a sensitive area.205  The Regulations also provide that public participation, 
as part of an EIA, must take place before a decision is taken to “proceed with the 
construction or improvement to which the assessment relates.”206       
 
The Regulations therefore do not provide any guidance on how to deal with ex post 
facto EIA authorizations. 
 
England 
Among the laws that require EIAs in England are the Town and Country Planning 
(Environmental Assessment and Permitted Development) Regulations 1995.207  
These Regulations are made under the European Communities Act.208  They are 
designed to apply prospectively as they refer to a “prospective developer” who is 
defined as “a person … who intends to undertake development …”209
 
The Regulations therefore do not provide any assistance on how to deal with ex post 
facto EIA authorizations.  It is, however, important to note that EIAs in England are 
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linked to planning applications as the following quote (from a document titled, 
“Using the Planning System to Conserve and Enhance your Local Environment – 
Planning Applications and Special Cases” captures it: 
 
“Developments likely to have significant effects on the environment are subject to 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).  Environmental Statements must 
accompany planning applications.”210
 
Curiously, the document states that “Retrospective Planning Applications 
Developments that have already been started or built without authorization may still 
be the subject of planning applications.  The arrangements for handling these are the 
same as far as any other application.  Refusal would almost inevitably be 
accompanied by enforcement action to remedy the damage already done or remove 
any building erected without planning permission.”211  The document is drafted in the 
form of an internal memorandum for relevant planning department/s.  It therefore 
appears that, even though the law is silent on ex post facto EIA authorizations, a 
practice has emerged in terms of which such EIAs are undertaken and, in some cases, 
authorizations are granted.  As indicated in Chapter 1, Fuller argued that it amounts to 
legislating for disaster to have a lack of congruence between the laws as they are 
written, on the one hand, and the practice of administering those laws, on the other. 
 
Important to note, in 212this regard, is that the position that in respect of a decision to 
refuse an ex post facto authorization to accompany the refusal by an enforcement 
action is similar to that introduced in South African law by the amendment to NEMA 
as discussed below. 
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212 As discussed below, under NEMA, a refusal of an ex post facto EIA application is a directive to take 
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Scotland 
In Scotland there are also a number of statutory provisions which require the 
undertaking of EIAs.  Among these are the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002.213  These Regulations require that certain 
planning applications214 be subjected to an EIA before a decision is made approving 
or refusing those applications.215  In this way, the Regulations are similar to those of 
England discussed above as they do not deal with the issue if ex post facto EIAs and 
provide no guidance for the South African situation.      
 
Kingdom of Lesotho  
The Kingdom of Lesotho (“Lesotho”)’s EIA regime is provided for in Part V of the 
Environment Act 2001.  As it is discussed below, this Act, interestingly, provides for 
a possibility of the undertaking of an ex post facto EIA in limited circumstances. 
 
Attached to the Act is a Schedule that specifies projects and activities, which trigger 
the requirement to undertake an EIA.216  In all, there are currently 18 types of projects 
and activities set out in the Schedule.  The Act is clear in its requirement that a 
“developer … prior to commencing, carrying out, executing or conducting a project 
or activity specified in the Schedule” must submit to the Environment Authority a 
project brief.217  In this regard, there is no doubt that the Act envisages that an EIA 
must precede a specified activity or project since the submission of a project brief is 
the first step in the EIA process.  A project brief must state, among other things, the 
nature of the project; the activities to be undertaken; and, the environment that may 
be affected.218   
 
The second step in the EIA process is the consideration of the project brief by the 
Authority.  The Authority has a wide discretion on deciding what happens after 
                                                 
213 No. 324 of 2002. 
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considering the project brief.  It may require the developer to submit further 
information,219 or approve the project or activity,220 or require that an EIA be 
conducted.221  The discretion of the Authority is subject to consultation of the 
relevant Line Ministry and the formulation of an opinion whether the project is likely 
to have a significant impact on the environment or not.222   Also of importance, where 
the Authority is of the view that there is likely to be significant impact on 
environment, the Authority is obliged to invite written or oral comments from the 
public on the project brief and, where necessary, it may consult the community of 
areas where the proposed project will be situated.223
 
The third step is the undertaking of an EIA, where it is required, which EIA includes 
assessment of alternative sites,224 environmental impact of proposed activity or 
project,225 mitigation measures.226  Public participation is also part of the EIA 
process.227  The EIA process culminates into an environmental impact statement.228
 
The fourth step is the submission of an environmental impact statement to, and its 
consideration by, the Authority.229  The Authority has a wide discretion, which 
includes a decision to approve or reject the project or activity;230 to subject the project 
to require further public participation;231 and, to require a redesign of the project, 
taking into account the suggestion and comments made by the public and all 
environmental factors.232
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The fifth step is the Authority’s granting or refusal of an EIA licence.233  This step, 
obviously, stems from the fourth step.  The Act states clearly that “no one shall 
operate, execute or carry out a project or activity specified in the Schedule without” 
an EIA licence234 and, if a person does not adhere to this prohibition, he or she or it 
commits an offence which triggers, on conviction, a fine not less than M5,000 but not 
exceeding M100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not less than two years and not 
exceeding 10 years or to both fine and imprisonment.235  These provisions of the Act 
clearly indicate that the Act intends to prohibit the undertaking of specified activities 
without an EIA.      
 
Furthermore, the Act prohibits other licensing authorities, acting in terms of any other 
law, from issuing a licence or permit with respect to a project or activity for which an 
EIA may be required unless the application for such a licence is accompanied by an 
EIA licence issued under the Act or there is a Certificate by the Authority stating that 
is not required under the Act.236  In this way, the Act ensures that the EIA 
authorisation precedes other licences that may be issued in respect of an activity or 
project.       
 
It is also important to note that, in addition to the provisions discussed above, the Act 
specifically envisages the undertaking of an EIA after an EIA licence has been issued.  
In this regard, the Authority has discretion to direct the holder of a licence to submit 
fresh environmental statement one of the two conditions is present: either there is a 
substantial change or modification in the project or in the manner in which the project 
is being operated;237 or, the project poses environmental threat, which could not have 
been reasonably foreseen at the time of the first study.238   These provisions are 
strengthened by the fact that a failure to comply with a directive issued by the 
Authority is an offence which, upon conviction, triggers liability to a fine not less 
                                                 
233 Section 33(2). 
234 Section 33(1). 
235 Section 33(5). 
236 Section 33(4). 
237 Section 34(1)(a). 
238 Section 34(1)(b).  
 57
than M5,000 but not exceeding M10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not less than 
two years but not exceeding ten years or to both a fine and imprisonment;239 and the 
cancellation of an EIA licence. 
 
The scope of an ex post facto EIA is accordingly provided for in the Act.  Firstly, the 
scope is limited to situations where there was an EIA licence.  Hence, it is limited to 
situations where an EIA was conducted before a specified project or activity was 
commenced with.  Secondly, the project or activity must have been commenced with 
and either of the two conditions discussed above is present.  Thirdly, and by 
implication, situations where a specified activity or project has been commenced 
without the requisite EIA licence fall outside the ambit of the ex post facto EIA 
process envisaged by the Act.  Fourthly, an ex post facto EIA provided for is a 
reactive mechanism.  It can only be done at the behest of the Authority.  In other 
words, a directive by the Authority is a jurisdictional fact that must be present before 
an ex post facto EIA may be undertaken in compliance with the provisions of the Act.  
 
Four points are worth noting in respect of the ex post facto EIA process envisaged by 
the Act.  One, the Act does not set out a separate EIA procedure for ex post facto 
EIAs.  This means that they must follow the ordinary EIA process which is set out in 
the Act and is discussed above.  The ordinary EIA procedure is not designed to be 
followed where the activity has been commenced with.  This, potentially, is 
problematic.  The Act also states that an ex post facto EIA is a fresh EIA.   A question 
arises whether a supplementary EIA is not more appropriate compared to a fresh EIA.   
 
Two, that an ex post facto EIA is undertaken with respect to an activity or project 
does not mean that an ex post facto EIA authorisation would be granted.  Instead, the 
Authority exercises its discretion as if an ex post facto EIA were a new EIA although, 
it is submitted, it does take into account that the activity or project had been 
commenced with under an EIA authorisation.  The tension that arises here is: how can 
the Authority achieve this without treating a fresh EIA as a supplementary EIA.  It is 
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submitted that to disregard the old EIA process in its entirety, when considering a 
fresh EIA, is untenable.  In fact, disregarding some of the aspects of the old EIA may 
amount to a failure to consider relevant considerations and, that, may result in 
administrative decisions taken by the Authority being judicially reviewed and set 
aside by the courts.    
 
Three, with respect to all other situations where an activity or project has been 
commenced with without an EIA the Act relies on its criminal sanctions and other 
control mechanisms. 
 
Four, the discretionary powers are also provided to the Authority to direct an EIA 
where there is an EIA licence but it turns out that the activity results in significant 
environmental effects which were not contemplated when an EIA was undertaken. 
 
In summary, therefore, the limited ex post facto EIA process envisaged by the Act 
deals with situations where a person had obtained an EIA licence but the two 
conditions that are discussed above are met.  It is not, therefore, relevant to the 
situation where an activity or project is commenced without a requisite licence.  It is 
submitted that there is doubt whether it makes sense to distinguish between situations 
where there was an EIA licence but its conditions were not complied with and where 
there was no EIA licence at all.  At least, in certain circumstances, such a distinction 
may lead to absurdity.  An example, in this regard, is a situation where there has been 
a significant breach of the conditions of an EIA licence to an extent that it may said 
that there was no compliance, at all, with an EIA licence.  In such a situation, it is 
submitted, there is no substantive distinction between an activity undertaken without 
an EIA to the one undertaken in significant breach of the EIA licence.  In principle, in 
that situation, there is no distinction between the two activities.  It is absurd for the 
law to treat such activities differently.                          
         
 59
India 
In India EIAs are provided for in terms of the Environmental Clearance Notification, 
1993 (the “Notification”).  The Notification was issued by the relevant Minister under 
powers conferred by section 3(2)(v) read with section 29(3) of the Environment 
(Protection) Act.240  To the Notification, Schedules I and II are attached which 
contain, respectively, lists of activities which require an environmental clearance 
before they are undertaken.241  The Notification requires that an application for an 
environmental clearance must include an EIA report and an Environmental 
Management Plan in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central 
Government in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.242
 
The Notification clearly does not envisage the undertaking of an ex post facto EIA.  It 
states that an EIA must be undertaken by “a person who desires” to undertake a 
Scheduled activity.243  It also states that “No work preliminary or otherwise relating 
to the setting up of the project may be undertaken till the environmental authorization 
is obtained.”244  There is therefore no doubt that the Indian Environment (Protection) 
Act does not provide for ex post facto EIA authorization.  The Act envisages that 
action may be taken to prosecute those who commence activities without the required 
authorization. 
 
The manner in which India has dealt with the issue of ex post facto EIA is to provide 
for it on an ad hoc basis. On 5 November 1998, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry issued a circular giving defaulters who had commenced activities without the 
requisite environmental clearance an opportunity to undertake EIAs and apply for 
environmental clearance by 31 March 1999.245  In that circular, no mention of action 
to be taken against defaulters and some commentators described this as 
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“shocking.”246 The Ministry has been extending these opportunities to defaulters ever 
since.247        
 
There are two points to note in the manner in which India provides for ex post facto 
EIAs.  Firstly, the providing of ad hoc ex post facto EIAs is based on the fact that the 
EIA regime does not provide for them.  Secondly, there seems to be very weak 
environmental laws in India, EIA regime included.  Rohit Prajapati captures the 
essence of this when stating that “environmental laws appear to be mere paperwork 
and a formality” and that the functioning of industries without environmental licences 
is so common to an extent that “only 5 per cent of Industrial units obtained 
consent.”248  A lesson that can be drawn from the Indian experience, therefore, is how 
to deal with a very weak EIA regime where 95 per cent of Industrial units are 
operating without EIA authorisation.  In such a country there is no threat of 
prosecution which spurs the defaulters into compliance. 
 
Kingdom of Cambodia 
In the Kingdom of Cambodia (“Cambodia”) EIAs are required by the Sub-Decree on 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process249 which applies to “every proposed and 
ongoing project(s)” described in the annexure to the Sub-Decree.250  In this regard, 
the Sub-Decree clearly envisages both a prospective EIA on proposed projects and an 
ex post facto EIA on ongoing projects.   
 
Important to note here is that an ex post facto EIA envisaged in the Sub-Decree is in 
respect of an activity that was commenced with without an EIA because it was not a 
requirement at the time but the Sub-Decree subsequently require that an EIA be 
undertaken on it.  Two sets of procedures, respectively, for reviewing prospective 




249 No. 72 ANRK.BK dated 11 August 1999. 
250 Article 2. 
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EIAs251 and retrospective EIAs.252  With respect to the latter, on the requirements is 
that an EIA must be conducted and EIA reports compiled and submitted to the 
relevant authorities for review and approval at least within a year of the promulgation 
of the Sub-Decree.253
 
The type of ex post facto EIA similar to the one provided for in Cambodia has been 
introduced in the NEMA EIA regime as discussed below. 
 
Conclusion    
        
As is clear from above, most foreign law discussed above does not provide any 
guidance on how to deal with the issue of ex post facto EIA.  It seems that in these 
jurisdictions the issue is left to the practical application of the relevant legal 
provisions which impose the requirement to undertake an EIA.  As is shown in the 
case of Canada the Supreme Court ordered the undertaking of an EIA after the project 
was 40 per cent completed.  In that way the court implicitly endorsed a view that an 
ex post facto may be granted in certain circumstances.  The court in this regard, 
however, did not develop any principles which principles can be interpreted and 
applied in the South African context.   It also seems that in some countries, notably, 
England the issue is left to practice which apparently provides for ex post facto EIAs. 
 
It is only in the case of Lesotho and India that there are statutory provisions providing 
for ex post facto EIA authorisations.  As is discussed above, these also have their 
problems.   
 
What is clear from foreign law is whether there is a provision for ex post facto EIA 
authorisations or not, either way potentially creates problems.  Below I discuss the 
provisions of South African law that provides for ex post facto EIA authorisations.  
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Where appropriate, I indicate similarities and differences with ex post facto EIA 
provisions of India and Lesotho.  
 
CHAPTER 6: EX POST FACTO AUTHORISATION IN TERMS OF 
THE AMENDMENT ACT 
 
The NEMA provides for its own EIA framework which framework, in due course, 
will replace the current EIA framework.  From 29 January 1999 to 6 January 2005, 
the NEMA EIA framework existed side by side with the current EIA framework as 
Judge Dennis Davis in the Silvermine Valley judgment captured the essence of this 
situation when he stated that, “Because ss 21 and 22 of the ECA remain in force, 
where a person seeks authorisation to carry out an activity identified under s 21 of the 
ECA, the ECA Regulations continue to apply, subject to compliance with s 24(7) of 
NEMA.”254   
 
During this period, the trigger for the application of the NEMA EIA regime was a 
two-stage test, which required (1) that the activity must require authorisation or 
permission by law and (2) that it might significantly affect the environment.255   
Where the test is satisfied, an EIA had to be conducted which complied with 
requirements set out in section 24(7).256  This caused a lot of confusion since the 
second stage of the test was flexible and, whether it was met or not, depended on the 
circumstances of each case.  Furthermore, it seemed that the test was met in almost all 
proposed activities which trigger the application of the ECA EIA regime and, in that 
situation, two EIA regimes had to be undertaken in respect of one activity. 
 
On 7 July 2005, the National Environmental Management Second Amendment Act257 
(the “Amendment Act”) removed the two-stage test and, in that way, changed the 
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requirements that trigger the application of NEMA EIA regime.258  The Amendment 
Act gives powers to the Minister and every Member of the Executive Council 
(“MEC”) responsible for environmental affairs in the province to identify activities 
which trigger the requirement to undertake the NEMA EIA regime.259  The MEC, in 
exercising these powers, must act in concurrence with the Minister.260  The Minister 
or the MEC may identify: 
(a) activities which may not commence without authorisation from the competent 
authority;261 
(b) geographical areas based on environmental attributes in which specified activities 
may not commence without environmental authorisation from the competent 
authority;262 
(c) geographical areas based on environmental attributes in which specified activities 
may be excluded from authorisation by the competent authority;263 
(d) individual or generic existing activities which may have a detrimental effect on 
the environment and in respect of which an application for an environmental 
authorisation must be made to the competent authority.264  
 
A few points are worth noting here.  There is nothing new in South African law in 
respect of the powers that the powers that the Minister or the MEC may exercise in 
terms of (a).  These powers are similar to those that exercised in terms of the ECA in 
identifying activities that trigger the requirement to undertake an EIA.  A proviso, in 
this regard, is that an MEC is empowered to identify activities which is not the case in 
the current EIA framework.  The powers that are set out in (b), (c) and (d) are new.  
In respect of (b) and (c), the MEC has to identify geographical areas and specify 
activities in those areas which activities require or do not require authorisation.  The 
identification of geographical areas will be based on environmental attributes.  Also 
important to note is that the powers to identify “excluded activities”, which is 
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provided for in (c) above are new in South African law.  Also new are the powers to 
identify “existing activities” as provided for in (d).  The powers set out in (d) are a 
clear indication that NEMA envisages that an EIA may be undertaken in respect an 
activity that has commenced. As discussed above, this amounts to an ex post facto 
EIA which is similar to the one provided for in Cambodia.  It must be distinguished 
between the granting of an EIA authorisation under the powers set out in (d) and the 
issue of ex post facto EIA authorization which is the principal subject of this 
dissertation.  Under the powers set out in (d) an authorisation would be required and, 
where appropriate, granted in respect of an activity which commenced lawfully at a 
time when there was no legal requirement to undertake an EIA, and the requirement 
comes into effect later, so that an EIA and, subsequently, an authorisation is required 
before the activity may be continued with.  
 
Together the powers set out above complicate the NEMA EIA regime from the 
outset, at the stage of determining whether the requirement to undertake an EIA is 
triggered or not.  The powers set out in (b), (c) and (d), therefore, indicate a shift, in 
South African environmental law dealing with EIAs, from simplicity to complexity.  
Glazewski states that the new EIA regime represents “a far-reaching and not 
altogether satisfactory departure … of the EIA practice in South Africa … which has 
evolved over the last decade or more.”265
 
The NEMA EIA regime sets out the minimum requirements, which requirements 
must be ensured in an EIA which is undertaken in terms of NEMA.266  The NEMA 
EIA regime will be perfected by the promulgation of relevant regulations, which 
regulations will be promulgated under section 24 as amended.  It is only upon the 
promulgation of these regulations that effect of the NEMA EIA regime will be felt. 
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It is an offence to commence an activity identified under (a) or (b) above without an 
environmental authorisation and to continue an existing activity identified under (d) 
without an environmental authorisation.267  It is also an offence to contravene a 
condition of an environmental authorisation.268  I refer to these offences as “a section 
24F offence.”  A defence that may be raised, by an accused, in respect of a section 
24F offence is that the activity was commenced or continued in response to an 
emergency in order to protect human life, property or the environment.269   Where a 
person is convicted of a section 24F offence a court may impose a fine not exceeding 
R5 million or a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and 
such imprisonment.270
 
It is important to note that the sentence that may be imposed on a person who is 
convicted of committing a section 24F offence is huge and is an improvement from 
equivalent provisions of the ECA which provisions are discussed above.  What is 
disturbing, however, is that these provisions, unlike equivalent provisions of the 
ECA, are not linked to the application of the provisions of section 34 of NEMA 
which are discussed above.  As discussed above, the provisions of section 34 are 
important as they provide for, among other things, the imputing of a company’s 
liability on its directors and other employees when a person is convicted of an 
offence.  They also provide for the forfeiture of any benefit that was obtained as a 
result of the commission of an offence.  Nevertheless, the penalty set out in the 
Amendment Act has a reasonable chance to act as a deterrent. 
 
The above provisions clearly indicate that the Amendment Act obliges the 
undertaking of an EIA before undertaking a listed activity.  This is obviously 
excluding those activities listed under (d) as they would be existing activities.  It is 
submitted that the powers to list activities under (d) may be challenged on the basis 
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that they would effectively deprive persons of the benefits of activities commenced 
with lawfully.     
 
Crucially, the Amendment Act also, for the first time in South African law, expressly 
provides for an ex post facto EIA authorisation.  This is applicable to a person who 
has committed a section 24F offence.271  The Amendment Act sets out a process that 
must be followed by such a person with a view that, in appropriate circumstances, an 
ex post facto EIA authorisation might granted by the competent authority. 
 
The first step in this process is that a person who has committed a section 24F offence 
applies to the Minister or the MEC, depending on which between these authorities has 
authority to grant an environmental authorisation that was required before the 
commencement or continuing with the identified activity.272  A person who 
committed a section 24F offence is not obliged to lodge this application.   It is open to 
such person to take advantage of the ex post facto EIA regime.  Also important to 
note is that, by virtue of lodging an application in terms of these provisions, a person 
admits to having committed a section 24F offence.  This is a prerequisite for taking 
advantage of these provisions.  It is also important to note that, in this regard, the 
provisions of the Amendment Act are not as limited as the Lesotho’s Environment 
Act.  As discussed above, in terms of the Lesotho’s Environment Act, ex post facto 
EIAs are limited to where an environmental authorization was granted, in the first 
place.  The Amendment Act avoids the absurdity that results from the application of 
the Lesotho’s Environment Act which absurdity is also discussed above. 
 
The second step comprises the Minister or the MEC considering the application and 
the appropriate order to be issued against the applicant.273  In this regard, the Minister 
or the MEC may direct the applicant: 
(a) to compile a report containing – 
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(i) an assessment of the nature, extent, duration and significance of the 
impacts of the activity on the environment, including the cumulative 
impacts; 
(ii) a description of mitigation measures undertaken or to be undertaken in 
respect of the impacts of the activity on the environment; 
(iii) a description of the public participation process followed during the course 
of compiling the report, including all comments received from interested 
and affected parties and an indication of how issues raised have been 
addresssed; 
(iv) an environmental management plan; and  
(b) to provide such other information or undertake such further studies as the Minister 
or the MEC may deem necessary.274  
 
The Minister and the MEC are, accordingly, given discretionary powers to order an 
ex post facto EIA.  As is clear from the powers set out above, what is envisaged is a 
full EIA which takes into account, among other things, cumulative effects and 
comments from a public participation process.  Absent from such an EIA process is 
the consideration of alternatives since, in most circumstances, it would be an anomaly 
to consider alternatives of an activity that has already been commenced with or 
continued with in contravention of a requirement to undertake an EIA.  The report of 
this EIA must be submitted to the Minister or the MEC. 
 
The third step comprises the Minister or the MEC considering and determining the 
appropriate administration fine, which must not exceed R1 million, to be imposed on 
the applicant.275  The applicant must pay the fine before the Minister or the MEC may 
consider the report.276  This is problematic because a fine precedes the consideration 
of reports.  This poses a question: what is the basis for determining a fine?  It would 
make more sense, in my view, to consider the ex post fact EIA before determining a 
fine to be imposed on the applicant. 
                                                 
274 Section 24G(1)(a) and (b). 
275 Section 24G(2). 
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In the fourth step, the Minister or the MEC, after receipt of the fine from the 
applicant, considers the report and may: 
(a) direct the applicant to cease the activity, either wholly or in part, and to 
rehabilitate the environment within such time and subject to such conditions as 
the Minister or the MEC may deem necessary; or 
(b) issue an ex post facto environmental authorisation to the applicant subject to 
conditions that the Minister or the MEC deem fit.277 
 
Where a person, including the applicant, is dissatisfied by the decision of the Minister 
or the MEC, such a person may lodge a review of that decision with a relevant 
Division of the High Court.  This is because the decision of the Minister or the MEC 
is an administrative decision under the provisions of the Promotion of the 
Administrative Justice Act.278  Also important to note is that a failure to comply with 
a directive issued by the Minister or the MEC or to contravene an ex post facto EIA 
authorisation is an offence with the same penalties as those imposed for committing a 
section 24F offence.  These penalties are discussed above.  This provides an 
interesting scenario.  In respect of the same activity it would be possible to commit 
two offences.  This is because a person may undertake a listed activity without an 
EIA authorization and, in that way commits a section 24F offence.  Where such a 
person lodges an application in terms of section 24G, he or she or it may commit a 
section 24G offence if he or she or it fails to comply with a directive issued in terms 
of section 24G or contravenes the provisions of an ex post facto EIA authorization 
where granted.  In due course courts would have to consider whether prosecuting a 
person for the same activity, in respect of the two sets of offences, is consistent with 
the rule of law.   
 
The Amendment Act, therefore, expressly introduces the possibility of undertaking an 
ex post facto EIA and, logically, the granting of an ex post facto EIA authorisation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
276 Section 24G(2). 
277 Section 24G(2)(a) and (b). 
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As noted above, the issue of ex post facto EIA authorisation is dealt with in different 
ways in different jurisdictions.  The Amendment Act, in this regard, therefore, ushers 
a new dispensation of an EIA framework in South African law.  It is submitted that 
one of the reasons for the Amendment Act to usher this new dispensation is that the 
current situation which does not explicitly provides for an ex post facto EIA 
authorisation is unsatisfactory since there are no clear principles which govern the 
issue.  The courts have not developed these principles and this left the issue on the 
legislature.   
 
The main question which arises is whether the new dispensation would be abused or 
not.  The possibility for abuse may arise since unscrupulous developers may take a 
view that, instead of conducting an EIA in respect of a listed activity, they undertake 
the activity with a view that if they have a reason to believe that the relevant 
authorities are considering the taking of enforcement measures against them they 
(developers) would lodge an application for an ex post facto authorization as a pre-
emptive strike.  Only time will tell on how would the relevant authorities deal with 
such situations.   
 
What is clear at this stage is that the provisions of the Amendment Act create a 
contradiction in the EIA regime.  The law provides that an EIA must be undertaken 
before an activity may be undertaken and, in the same breath, provides that an EIA 
may be undertaken after the activity is undertaken.  This contradiction is, however, 
counter-balanced by the fact that it is based on a realistic assessment of the South 
African situation in that there would be people who will undertake listed activities 
without the requisite authorization.  The provisions of section 24G are also based on 
the reality that responsible organ/s of state cannot prosecute all those who will 
undertake listed activities without an EIA and, accordingly, it makes sense to provide 
for some of those persons to approach the authorities in order to bring those activities 
within the control of the responsible authorities.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
278 3 of 2000. 
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The most obvious positive aspect of the provisions of section 24G is that the 
competent authority has an opportunity to consider the activity in light of the ex post 
facto EIA reports.  As Ahmad and Wood put it, “ the most important decision made 
during the EIA process is whether to approve the project or to reject it.”279  If the 
competent authority approves such a project it may impose conditions with a view to 
protect the environment through the adoption of mitigation measures.      
 
Also of importance is to note that the granting of an ex post facto EIA authorisation 
does not exempt the holder from prosecution for the initial commission of a section 
24F offence. This is because the Minister or the MEC does not have powers to 
exempt a person from being prosecuted for the committed offence.  Such powers, to 
pardon or reprieve an offender, are granted only to the President by the provisions of 
the Constitution.280  Perhaps this is what saves the ex post facto EIA provisions from 
contravening the environmental right as enshrined in the Constitution.  The 
undertaking of an ex post facto EIA and, where appropriate, the granting of an ex post 
facto EIA authorization do not take away that that a constitutional right has been 
infringed through the undertaking of an activity without an EIA.  Nor are the 
remedies that are available to those who were affected by the activity when it was 
undertaken without an authorization.    
 
The essence of an ex post facto EIA authorisation, therefore, is to permit the activity 
from the day the authorisation is given. It will be up to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to decide whether or not to prosecute the offender.281  In fact, the 
Director is obliged to prosecute such persons since they have infringed a 
constitutional right to an environment that is not harmful to people’s health or well-
being.  Upon conviction of an offender, for that offence, a court would consider the 
penalties that are set out in the Amendment Act which penalties are discussed above.  
This is interesting in that the offender, by taking advantage of the ex post facto EIA 
                                                 
279 Baslam Ahmad and Christopher Wood, A comparative evaluation of the EIA systems in Egypt, Turkey 
and Tunisia, Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2002, Pages 213-234, 
page 223.  
280 Section 84(2)(j) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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provisions, opens himself or herself or itself to being prosecuted for historic 
contraventions of the EIA law. 
   
Finally, the new dispensation has not yet come into effect since the Minister and the 
respective MECs are still to promulgate regulations which will perfect the NEMA 
EIA regime. 
 
Application of section 24G to the current EIA framework 
The provisions of section 24G read with the provisions of section 7 made the section 
24G applicable to the current EIA framework.  Section 7 of the Amendment Act 
provides that: 
 
“For a period of six months after the date on which this Act comes into operation, the 
provisions of section 24G of the principal Act apply, with the necessary changes, in 
respect of any listed activity commenced or continued in contravention of a provision 
of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (Act No. 73 of 1989).” 
 
This Act came into operation on 7 January 2005 and, accordingly, this provision was 
applicable from 8 January 2005 until 8 July 2005.  Because this period was provided 
for in the Act, the Minister or an MEC had no authority to extend it.  This is 
problematic since some people who wanted to take advantage of the opportunity 
provided for by these provisions may have missed the opportunity for some justifiable 
reasons.  Sadly, there is no remedy for such a situation other than to effect an 
amendment of the Act.  If the Minister or the MEC were to consider such applications 
and then make decisions, purportedly acting in terms of the provisions of section 7 
read with the provisions of section 24G, such decisions would be ultra vires and 
susceptible to a legal challenge on their validity. 
 
The phrase “with the necessary changes” in section 7 enjoins one to read the 
provisions of section 24G in a manner that makes the latter provisions work for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
281 Section 20(3) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 
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person who has undertaken an activity without an EIA authorisation and in 
contravention of the provisions of the ECA.  This means that an applicant who sought 
to take advantage of the provisions of section 24G must be a person who committed 
an offence in terms of section 29(4) of the ECA as opposed to have committed a 
section 24F offence.  It also means that the applicant must be a person who has/had 
committed such an offence before 6 July 2005.  Also of importance to note is that the 
phrase “continued” in section 7 is irrelevant for the purposes of interpreting section 
24G for these purposes since the ECA only prohibits the undertaking of or 
commencement with the identified activity.      
 
Furthermore, in light what is discussed above regarding the powers to exempt 
offenders from prosecution being vested in the President and to no one else, the 
taking advantage of these provisions does not exempt a person from being prosecuted 
for having committed an offence in terms of section 29(4) of the ECA.  This 
undermined what was otherwise an excellent opportunity to rectify historic 
contraventions of the ECA provisions in order to facilitate a smooth transition from 
current EIA regime to the NEMA EIA framework.    
 
Crucially, a person who failed to take advantage of the provisions of the Amendment 
Act, having committed an offence in terms of section 29(4) of the ECA, may not be 
prosecuted for that offence under the provisions of NEMA as amended by the 
Amendment Act.  Such a person has not committed an offence under NEMA.  This 
situation must be distinguished from a situation where a person who committed an 
offence in terms of section 29(4) lodged an application to rectify his activity in terms 
of the provisions of the Amendment Act.  Such a person may be prosecuted in terms 
of the NEMA if he fails to comply with a directive issued under section 24G(2)(a) of 
the NEMA or if he contravenes an ex post facto EIA authorization issued in terms of 
section 24G(2)(b).  Consequently, it is only such a person who may, on conviction, be 
liable to a fine not exceeding R5 million or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding ten years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.282     
                                                 
282 In terms of section 24F(4). 
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The point made above was completely missed by DEAT and the relevant provincial 
department of environmental affairs.  For instance, a guideline document titled, 
“Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment: Section 24G, 
Guideline No. 1” told would be applicants “Should a person or company who has 
commenced or continuing with an activity listed in the EIA Regulations not apply 
within the 6 month period he/she will be guilty of an offence in terms of Section 24F 
of the Act and may be subject to a fine of R5 000 000 and/or 10 year 
imprisonment.”283  In light of what is discussed above, this is clearly not true. 
 
Furthermore, these transitional provisions are not free from doubt.  Interestingly, 
there are two ways of constructing the provisions of section 7 read with the provisions 
of section 24G.  The first way is to say that they fail to provide for a system of 
retrospective authorization since the provisions of section 24G are not yet applicable 
as their application would be triggered by the promulgation of EIA regulations under 
section 24 of the NEMA.  In terms of this reasoning, the provisions of section 7 read 
with the provisions of section 24G are meaningless since the EIA regulations were 
not promulgated between 8 January 2005 and 8 July 2005.  It is submitted that this 
way of construction is wrong on the basis that it is too technical and neglects the 
purpose of the provisions.  The second way, which I submit is correct, is to say that 
the effect of the provisions of section 7 read with the provisions of section 24G is to 
bring into operation the provisions of section 24G for the purposes of dealing with 
historic contraventions of the relevant provisions of the ECA.  This is effectively 
dealt with by the phrase in section 7 which requires provisions of section 24G to be 
applied with the “necessary changes.”  
 
Perhaps the most serious challenge to provisions of section 7 read with the provisions 
of section 24G is the argument which says that the effect of these provisions is that 
section 24G amounts to ex post facto law or retrospective law.  This argument states 
that section 24G is made to affect facts that existed prior to the enactment of the 
                                                 
283 Unnumbered pages 2 to 3 of the guideline document. 
 74
Amendment Act.  The contravention of the provisions of the ECA to which the 
Amendment Act provides a possibility to rectify took place before the Amendment 
Act became law.  This, so goes the argument, contravenes the rule of law which is 
one of the founding values of the Constitution.284  If this argument prevails it means 
that the provisions of section 24G may only be utilized to rectify activities that 
contravened the provisions of the ECA from 8 January 2005 to 8 July 2005.  Such a 
scenario would seriously undermine the effect of the provisions of section 7 read with 
the provisions of section 24G. 
 
There seems to be no answer to the above challenge except to distinguish the 
provisions of the Amendment Act from what is prohibited by the rule of law.  The 
prohibition against ex post facto laws is generally aimed at protecting individuals 
from being prosecuted for conduct which was not a crime when it was undertaken or 
from being subjected to a greater punishment than that provided by the law at the 
time of the commission of the offence.285  The aim of the Amendment Act is not to 
prosecute individuals for conduct which was not a crime when it was undertaken or to 
convict those individuals to a greater punishment than that provided for at the time of 
commission of the offence, but to provide for a smooth transition from one EIA 
regime to another.  In fact, the basis for applying under the provisions of section 7 
read with the provisions of section 24G is that a person has committed an offence 
under the provisions of the ECA. 
 
The provisions of section 7 read with the provisions of section 24G provided an ad 
hoc ex post facto EIA authorization in respect of the current EIA regime.  As 
discussed above, India provides for ex post facto EIAs in the same way.  It is 
important to note that India provides for ex post facto EIAs in this way, among others, 
on the basis that its EIA regime does not provide for ex post facto EIAs.  It is 
submitted that in the (South African) current EIA regime the Amendment Act 
provided for an ad hoc ex post facto EIAs in an attempt to ensure a smooth transition 
                                                 
284 Section 1. 
285 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_post_facto accessed on 23 August 2005. 
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from the current EIA regime to the NEMA EIA regime and not with a view to 
confirm that ex post facto EIAs are not provided for in the current EIA regime.  In 
other words, the question is still open whether the current EIA regime provides for an 
ex post facto EIA.  Now that 8 July 2005 has passed the position of the law in respect 
of ex post facto EIAs in the current EIA regime has returned to the state of 
uncertainty as it was on 7 January 2005.   
 
The attempts by the Amendment Act to ensure a smooth transition of the EIA system 
by providing for an ad hoc ex post facto EIA for activities undertaken without an 
ECA EIA authorization has failed dismally since the NEMA EIA regime is still not in 
operation.  In my view, it seems that the Legislature contemplated that the NEMA 
EIA regime was going to be perfected before 8 July 2005, which date was the closing 
of the window of opportunity to rectify activities undertaken in contravention of the 
ECA EIA regime.  The Legislature is now faced with a difficult choice of either 
following the Indian example where such windows of opportunity are extended 
perpetually or to simple allow the relevant organs of state to prosecute those who did 
not take advantage of the opportunity. 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation I discuss the issue of ex post facto EIA authorization in South 
African law from the inception of the formal EIA regime to present.  With respect to 
the current EIA regime, except between 8 January 2005 and 8 July 2005, the law does 
not expressly provide for the undertaking of EIAs once an activity has been 
undertaken.  Court decisions on the current EIA regime have suggested that the 
general rule is that an EIA precedes the undertaking of an activity which requires an 
EIA before it is undertaken.  These decisions suggest that it is an exception to this 
general rule that, in certain circumstances, it would be lawful to undertake an EIA 
after the activity has been commenced or completed.  These decisions do not set out 
the principles that determine what falls within the exception and what falls outside.         
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The new EIA regime which will be activated by the promulgation of relevant 
regulations under the NEMA explicitly provides for ex post facto EIAs.  This was 
effected by the coming into effect of the Amendment Act.  This Act also affected the 
current EIA regime.  The provisions of the Amendment Act provided for ex post facto 
EIAs between 8 January 2005 to 8 July 2005 on the current EIA regime.  The aim 
was to ensure a smooth transition from the current EIA regime to the NEMA EIA 
regime.  This has not been achieved since the NEMA EIA regime has not come into 
effect.               
 
The position of the current EIA regime is the same as that of eight foreign 
jurisdictions discussed above where EIA laws are silent on whether an ex post facto 
EIA is provided for or not.  It is argued in these jurisdictions EIA laws are clearly 
designed to ensure that an EIA takes place before an activity is undertaken.  In some 
of these countries, it appears that, ex post facto EIA authorisations are granted.  This 
results in a lack of congruence between the laws as promulgated and the practice.  In 
this regard, the practice in England when refusing such an authorisation is similar to a 
refusal under the Amendment Act in South Africa as it is an order forcing the 
applicant to restore the environment. 
 
This dissertation also discusses EIA laws of two countries which provide for ex post 
facto EIAs.  The first is Lesotho where an ex post facto is provided in limited 
circumstances.  These are circumstances where there is an environmental 
authorization which was granted by the Authority but was either not complied with or 
the environmental harm that results was not contemplated when the authorization was 
granted. In such circumstances the Authority may direct the undertaking of a fresh 
EIA.  An absurdity arises from this law as it distinguishes from a situation where 
there was an EIA and that where there was no EIA for the purposes of undertaking an 
ex post facto EIA.  Such a distinction serves no purpose where a person completely 
disregarded the provisions of the environmental authorization to the effect that its 




The second country which provides for ex post facto EIAs which is discussed in this 
dissertation is India.  This country provides for ad hoc ex post facto EIAs as it 
provides for windows of opportunity to those who have undertaken Scheduled 
activities without an environmental clearance to undertake ex post facto EIA and 
lodge applications for environmental clearance before a stipulated date.  The 
stipulated dates have been perpetually extended to allow more defaulters to conduct 
ex post facto EIAs with a view to obtaining an environmental licence.  The provisions 
of the Amendment Act (section 7 read with section 24G) have the effect of a similar 
(ad hoc) ex post facto EIA regime in South Africa.  In South Africa, the window of 
opportunity has not been extended to allow more defaulters to take advantage of the 
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